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ABSTRACT
EXCHANGE PATTERNS AND RELATIONS IN COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE
Charles Wharton Kaye-Essien
May 13, 2016
Collaborative governance has received considerable attention in recent years.
From environmental resource management to public safety, collaborative governance
continues to play a vital role in regional problem solving. In spite of this increasing
popularity previous attempts to model the political, economic, and demographic
determinants of collaboration have in most cases produced inconsistent results, thereby
undermining the ability to generalize from such findings. Additionally, our understanding
of the relational patterns that emanate from collaborative agreements remains fairly
rudimentary.
The main objective of this research is to address some of the gaps in the literature
and improve our understanding of collaborative governance by examining existing
patterns of collaboration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Using transaction cost
economics theory and the concept of network embeddedness as theoretical lenses, the
study examines collaborative governance by going beyond what already exists in current
literature – determinants of collaboration– to explore what has barely been addressed –
patterns of collaboration. This research includes which services are the strongest
candidates for collaboration, which levels of government are the best candidates for

v

partnerships (vertical or horizontal) and what number of partners are appropriate for
collaborative arrangements (bilateral or multilateral).
The units of analysis for this study are ‘home rule’ cities in Kentucky with
populations above 230 people. A city-by-service cross-sectional pooled data was derived
from existing agreements signed between years 2000 and 2013 to test the research
hypotheses. Descriptive statistics were used to measure the relation between transaction
characteristics and the pattern of collaboration while binary logistic regression models
were used to test the relation between network embeddedness and the pattern of
collaboration.
The findings of the study showed that compared to other public services,
economic development services have a greater association with vertical collaboration
whilst public safety services have a greater association with horizontal collaboration.
Similarly, infrastructure services have a greater association with bilateral collaboration
whilst public safety services have a greater association with multilateral collaboration.
The study also corroborated previous findings that asset specificity and service
measurability have strong influence on the likelihood of collaboration. With respect to
the pattern of collaboration, the study indicated that compared to other transaction
characteristics, services that have high levels of asset specificity but easily measurable
have greater associations with vertical and bilateral collaborations. Similarly, services
that have high levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty have greater
associations with horizontal and multilateral collaborations. With respect to network
embededdness, the study established that repeated interaction in the past has the most
significant influence on decisions to collaborate.
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CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

An Emerging Governance Model
Collaborative governance and its variants – administrative conjunction
(Fredrickson, 1999), cross-sector collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006; Simo & Bies, 2007),
collaborative planning (Healey, 2003; Innes & Booher, 1999; Selin & Chevez, 1995;
Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998) and collaborative public management (Agranoff,
2006; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Cooper et al., 2006; Leach, 2006) – have received
considerable attention in urban affairs, public management and environmental
management research over the past few decades (cf. Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011;
Gerlak et al., 2013; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Kettl, 2000;
O'Toole, 1997; Salamon, 2002; Weber et al., 2005). From infrastructure and housing
development to education and health care delivery, collaborative governance has
emerged as an essential institutional arrangement for providing public goods and
services (Tang & Mazmanian, 2010).
Similar to the emergence of hierarchies in the agricultural age and bureaucracies
during the industrial age (McGuire, 2006), collaborative governance has emerged as a
new management paradigm, one “… that defines its task more broadly than do previous
paradigms and achieves many of its purposes through a dynamic of network governance”
(Stoker, 2006, p. 43). Scholars of collaborative government have reiterated that vertical
1

hierarchies of command and control no longer possess the solutions to the complex
problems of the 21st century (Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; O'Toole, 1997). Rather,
collaborative webs of multiple government and nongovernmental institutions operating at
different scales and across different jurisdictions offer more inclusive and adaptable
solutions to the persistent contemporary problems of poverty, fiscal distress and natural
disasters (Alter & Hage, 1993; McGuire, 2006).
In public management, collaborative governance is the process of “…facilitating
and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be
solved, or easily solved, by single organizations” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4). In
urban affairs, collaborative governance is largely regarded as a mode of “governance
without government” (Savitch & Vogel, 2000). In the field of environmental resource
management collaborative governance is a process of pooling together institutional
resources to plan and manage cross-jurisdictional environmental problems (Bentrup,
2001; Gerlak & Heikkila, 2006; Innes & Booher, 1999; Selin & Chevez, 1995). Although
scholars approach the concept from different perspectives, the fundamental principle of
agreement is the notion of constructive engagement – open and inclusive communication
and the representation of diverse interests. As Bressers, O’Toole, and Richardson (1995)
observe:
“No organization of government possesses sufficient authority,
resources, and knowledge to effect the enactment and achievement
of policy intentions. Instead, policies require the concerted efforts of
multiple actors, all possessing significant capabilities but each
dependent on multiple others to solidify policy intention and convert
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it into action. Indeed, it is often difficult for any one actor, or group
of actors, to manage, or manipulate, the flow of problems and
solutions onto the political agenda in the first place.” (p. 4)

Toward a Working Definition of Collaborative Governance
The concept of ‘governance’ is generally understood as the act of steering “…the
process that influences decisions and actions within the private, public, and civic sectors’’
(O'Leary et al., 2006, p. 7). The term ‘collaborative’ on the other hand denotes colaboring and cooperating across boundaries in multi-sector relationships to achieve
common goals (O’Leary et al., 2009, p. 3). Put together, collaborative governance
conveys the notion that existing institutions across localities can be harnessed in a
cooperative, reciprocal, fluid and voluntary manner (Savitch & Vogel, 2000) to provide
public services (Parks & Oakerson, 1989). The definition of collaborative governance
adopted for this research is that of Tang and Mazmanian (2010, p. 4):
“…the process of establishing, steering, facilitating, operating, and
monitoring cross-sectoral organizational arrangements to address public
policy problems that cannot be easily addressed by a single organization or
the public sector alone. These arrangements are characterized by joint
efforts, reciprocal expectations, and voluntary participation among formally
autonomous entities, from two or more sectors —public, for profit, and
nonprofits —in order to leverage (build on) the unique attributes and
resources of each.”
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This definition of collaborative governance extends beyond the conventional focus
on the public manager (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003, p. 4) or the public – private
partnership (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011, p. x). Unlike these conventional definitions,
the Tang and Mazmanian (2010, p. 4) definition is broader, encompassing partnerships
among local governments, the private sector, civil society, and non-profits. Most
importantly, the Tang and Mazmanian (2010, p. 4) definition regards collaborative
governance as a process and not just an institutional arrangement.
Two forms of collaborative governance can be identified from the extant literature.
These are transactive collaborative governance (TCG) and institutionalized collaborative
governance (ICG). I refer to TCG in this study as a collaborative arrangement formed
voluntarily between municipalities, for profit institutions, non-profit institutions and
special districts for the purposes of ensuring the supply of public goods and services to
citizens. Feiock (2004, p. 6) observes that “local governments can act collectively to
create a civil society that integrates a region across multiple jurisdictions through a web
of voluntary agreements and associations and collective choices by citizens.” An ICG on
the other hand refers to a cross-jurisdictional institution that has been established by
statutory mandates to undertake specific tasks. The main structural difference between
the two forms of collaboration is that TCGs operate as economic exchange arrangements
while ICGs operate as typical bureaucracies led by a board of directors that includes
elected city officials and department heads.
TCGs include typical interlocal service exchanges like pay-for-service
agreements, joint service agreements and mutual aid arrangements. ICGs are often more
formalized and include area development districts (ADDs) and regional organizations
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that unite stakeholders on broader planning and development issues. The Commonwealth
of Kentucky has fifteen (15) ADDs that serve as a connection between local officials, the
Governor’s office, state and federal agencies, and private organizations (Kentucky
League of Cities, 2012). The twenty eight (28) National Estuary Programs (NEPs)
established under Section 320 of the 1987 Clean Water Act (CWA) to protect and restore
estuaries of national significance are also examples of ICGs. This study focuses on
transactive forms of collaborative governance.

United yet Divided: America’s Fragmented State
America’s local government remains highly fragmented. The 2012 Census of
Governments reports a total number of 90,056 local governments of which 38,910 (44
percent) are general-purpose and 51,146 (56 percent) are special–purpose governments.
For those who embrace fragmentation having many local governments means residents
can have unlimited access to a variety of urban services (Liesbet & Gary, 2003;
McGinnis & Ostrom, 2012; V. Ostrom et al., 1961). In his magnum opus, A Pure Theory
of Local Government Expenditure, Charles Tiebout (1956), a renowned public theorist,
opined that having many local governments within metropolitan regions promotes
economic efficiency through competition. Tiebout stressed that fragmentation allows
residents who are not satisfied with a particular set of services within a particular locality
to vote with their feet by moving to new jurisdictions. The public choice view has been
critiqued on a number of grounds. First public choice assumes that just like consumers in
a private market, residents and jurisdictions have full knowledge on the variety and
quality of services produced by different jurisdictions. In actuality people are bounded
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rational when it comes to residential mobility. Public choice also assumes that all public
services are excludable and so can be sold on the private market. However, the difficulty
of excluding residents from most public services encourage free riding which hinder the
private sale of these services (Shrestha, 2005).
While public choice theorists tout America’s fragmented local government system
as responsive and efficient, there are others who condemn its relative inefficiencies –
inequality and environmental spillover (c.f ACIR, 1985, 1987; Downs, 1994; Miller,
Miranda, Roque, & Wilf, 1995; Nice, 1987; Oakerson, 1999; Parks & Oakerson, 1989,
1993). Frederickson (1999, p. 702) opined that fragmentation in any form – jurisdictional
or institutional – constitutes a “disarticulation of the state” which is the greatest challenge
to an effective system of metropolitan governance.
Chief amongst those who oppose the public choice view are the consolidationists
who embrace the idea of having a unified metropolitan government. From the earlier
writings of Maxey (1922) and Reed (1949) to more recent scholarship from Cisneros
(1993), Downs (1994) and Rusk (2013), the main arguments cited in favor of
metropolitan government have been motivated by what these authors perceived as
inefficiencies and inequalities associated with local government fragmentation. To
consolidationists, too many local governments means duplication of services, inequality
and inner city decline. Some have observed that the fragmented system of local
governments does not provide the “…political leadership, sensitive to the well being and
interests of [an] the entire region, responsive to socioeconomic problems and planning for
the future” (Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000, p. 48). Rather, fragmentation inhibits policies
that address issues of metropolitan scale including economic inequality, inner-city
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decline, traffic congestion,

air and water pollution (Downs, 1994; Peirce, 1993; Rusk,

2013). To consolidationists the solution to these inefficiencies lies with a one-size-fits all
metropolitan government. They perceive that by bringing interjurisdictional activities
under one government complex issues can be effectively coordinated and dealt with in an
efficient manner.
Despite these seemingly positive remarks evidence suggests very few attempts at
consolidation have been successful (c.f Blomquist & Parks, 1995; A. Brierly, 2004; Carr
& Feiock, 1999; Feiock et al., 2006; Kelly & Adhikari, 2013; Rosentraub, 2000; Savitch
et al., 2009) One reason for this lack of success is that consolidation as a form of
territorial rescaling removes all jurisdictional autonomy, a condition most independent
cities reject. Additionally, having a unified government has been linked to principal-agent
and internal coordination problems (Chubb, 1985; Nicholson‐Crotty, 2004).

A Case for Transactive Collaborative Governance
From the arguments leveled so far against public choice and consolidation it
stands to reason that for efficiency gains local governments that value their autonomy
must turn to interlocal collaboration as the next best solution (Rothenberg, 1970;
Shrestha, 2005). In line with this thought, new regional scholars have propounded the
idea of metropolitan governance without government. At the backdrop of their
proposition were empirical findings that the fates of central cities and suburbs in the post
industrial era were tied to each other (c.f Adams & Savitch, 1997; Downs, 1994; Hill et
al., 1995; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992, 1993; Rusk, 2003, 2013; Savitch & Collins, 1992;
Savitch et al., 1993; Swanstrom, 1996; Voith, 1998; Wikstrom, 2002). New regionalists
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hold the view that the solutions to today’s public issues require multijurisdictional rather
than individual efforts. They contend that fragmented forms of local government are not
efficient in dealing with complex problems of equity, environment, and economy that
transcend local government boundaries. Instead, intergovernmental networks and
horizontal linkages offer prospective pathway for solving regional problems including
fiscal stress, segregation, and central city decline (Downs, 1994; Lowery, 2000; Savitch
& Vogel, 2000).
As globalization and information technology continue to alter the meaning of
physical space, voluntary collaboration and networking, as opposed to traditional
instruments of power and control are seen as the solutions to problems of the
disarticulated state (Frederickson, 1999). In their paper, Paths to New Regionalism,
Savitch and Vogel (2000) highlighted three metropolitan governance frameworks within
the American local government system. These frameworks, namely multi-tiered, linked
functions (functional consolidation) and complex networks (overlapping interlocal
agreements) represent hybrid forms of governance based on collaborative efforts. In the
view of Savitch and Vogel (2000) the “complex networks” approach is the perfect form
of metropolitan governance without government. It is a governance structure that allows
several local governments to collaborate voluntarily through overlapping webs of
interlocal agreements without sacrificing their autonomy (Adhikari, 2015; Feiock, 2009;
Feiock et al., 2004; Oakerson, 2004; Parks & Oakerson, 1989; Savitch & Vogel, 2000).
Collaboration is however not a substitute for competition. While jurisdictions may
compete for residents and businesses, the process of attracting these residents and
businesses need not necessarily be competitive (Adhikari, 2015; Howell‐Moroney, 2008).
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Even in highly fragmented regions where competition is rife, governance without
government and competition can still coexist (Adhikari, 2015; V. Ostrom et al., 1961;
Parks & Oakerson, 2000).

Justification for Research
In spite of its increasing popularity our understanding of the determinants,
patterns and relations in collaborative governance remains fairly rudimentary. Previous
attempts to model the political, economic, and demographic determinants of collaboration
have in most cases produced inconsistent results, thereby undermining the ability to
generalize from such findings (Carr et al., 2007; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Leroux,
2006; Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003; Wood, 2004; Zeemering, 2007).
Perhaps one reason for the lack of consensus in past studies is that most
researchers relied on the US Census of Government Finance which has not provided
dyadic information between transacting cities since 2007. Additionally, while most past
studies have tried to explain collaboration from a purely economic point of view, it is
becoming clearer in recent studies that local governments pursue different types of
collaboration for different reasons (Carr et al., 2007). The growing popularity of
collaborative governance provides a unique opportunity for urban and public
management scholars to begin to address critical exchange pattern questions that focus on
the direction (vertical or horizontal collaboration) and number of collaborating partners
(bilateral or multilateral collaboration) in an agreement. Horizontal collaboration here
refers to collaborative arrangements involving similar cohorts of local government (Carr
et al, 2009). Examples include municipalities collaborating with other municipalities,
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special districts or non-profits on services such as law enforcement, parking and street
sweeping. Conversely, vertical collaboration refers to collaboration between different
cohorts of local government. Examples include cities collaborating with counties on
infrastructure, economic development, emergency planning, animal control, and
environmental initiatives. A bilateral agreement in this study is one that has only two
partners of which one is a municipality. It could either be an agreement between two
municipalities, between a municipality and a county or between a special district and a
municipality. A multilateral agreement is one that has three or more partners of which at
least one is a municipality.

Research Objectives
The main objective of this research is to address gaps in the literature and improve
our understanding of collaborative governance by examining existing patterns of
collaboration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Using Williamson’s (1971) transaction
cost economics theory and the concept of network embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996) as
theoretical lenses, I examine collaborative governance by going beyond what already
exists in current literature – determinants of collaboration– to explore what has barely
been addressed – patterns if collaboration. This research includes which services are the
strongest candidates for collaboration, which levels of government are the best candidates
for partnerships (vertical or horizontal) and what number of partners are appropriate for
collaborative arrangements (bilateral or multilateral).
The novelty of this research is both conceptual and spatial. At the conceptual
level, the research attempts to complement the existing theory of collaborative
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governance by addressing two (2) main exchange questions – direction and number of
partners – that have not been thoroughly addressed in previous studies. Spatially, the
research contributes to the existing practice of regionalism by providing in-depth
explanation to the structure and nature of exchange patterns in collaborative governance
networks.

Scope of the Research
The units of analysis for this study are ‘home rule’ cities in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky with populations above 230 people. The choice of home rule cities in Kentucky
was made on the basis of data availability and convenience. The Kentucky Department of
Local Government maintains an online database which unlike the Census of
Governments provides information on dyadic relations between collaborating
municipalities. This information was useful for analyzing vertical and horizontal as well
as bilateral and multilateral exchanges. The study uses existing data on all interlocal
agreements signed between years 2000 and 2013 from. A city-by-service cross-sectional
pooled data was derived from existing agreements signed between years 2000 and 2013
to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter III. Besides data availability, convenience
was a key factor in study. The proximity of the selected cities to the University of
Louisville enabled quick and easier access to city officials in situations where
clarification of data was required.

11

Structure of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, I review
the existing theoretical and empirical literature related to collaborative governance and
highlight the research gaps. I place particular emphasis on three theoretical foundations –
Mancur Olsen’s (1965) logic of collective action, Williamson’s (1971) transaction cost
theory and the extant literature on network theory to explicate the relational patterns of
collaborative governance. Next in Chapter III, I outline the research questions and
propose six research hypotheses for further enquiry. Additionally I describe in detail the
research design, dataset and methodology for testing the hypotheses. In chapter IV I
report in detail the descriptive statistics and binary regression models on the patterns and
relationships of interlocal collaboration in Kentucky. Next in Chapter V I summarize and
discuss the main findings of the study and test the research hypothesis in the light of the
extant theoretical and empirical research. I conclude in chapter VI by discussing the
limitations as well as the academic and policy implications of this research.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKROUND TO COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE
Introduction
In the literature review that follows I explore both the theoretical and empirical
contexts of collaborative governance. I first identify the theoretical foundations of the
concept and their connection to the broader public administration and urban affairs
literature. The theoretical context is drawn from three grounded theories – the logic of
collective action, transaction cost economics and network theory. The empirical context
of collaborative governance on the other hand is drawn from the extant literature on
public management, metropolitan governance and new regionalism.

To Produce or To Provide – A Local Government Dilemma
The decision to make, buy or collaborate does not only apply to the firm (Coase,
1937; Geyskens et al., 2006; Gulati et al., 2005; Williamson, 1975). It also serves as one
of the major administrative dilemmas facing local governments. First envisaged by
Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961), the idea of a production–provision dichotomy – the
separation of public service provision from production – helps to redefine economic
functions in a public service economy. Production requires local communities to go into
the business of producing local goods and services themselves, while provision includes
mechanisms such as “contractual arrangements with private firms—or with other public
13

agencies” (V. Ostrom et al., 1961, p. 834). Drawing on V. Ostrom et al’s productionprovision logic, Parks and Oakerson (1989) have propounded what they perceive as a
system of governance without government in metropolitan regions constituted by local
‘public economies’. Indeed, Ostrom et al (1961) and Parks and Oakerson (1989) agree
that by choosing service provision over production local government leaders perform the
roles of decision makers and service coordinators.
Based on voter preferences, local governments are charged with the responsibility
of deciding between what combination of goods and services to produce in-house and
what to provide through other exchange mechanisms. It is the mission of every local
government to provide services to its citizens by using available information and
resources in a very productive and legitimate manner (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011). As
demonstrated in Figure 1, a rational local government could realize that acting
independently it may not be able to deliver a particular public service efficiently. Thus it
would be better off shifting its focus from in-house production to provision. Such
provision of service could be in the form of collaboration with other jurisdictions or
contracting out to private institutions. If a local government chooses to collaborate with
other jurisdictions on services it still has to decide the direction of collaboration as well
as the number of partners it wants to maintain in an agreement.
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Figure 1
The Public Service Delivery Dilema
Mode of Service
Delivery???
Provide
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Outsource
(Contract)

Collaborate

Number of
partners

Direction

Vertical
collaboration

Multilateral
collaboration

Horizontal
collaboration

Bilateral
collaboration

Source: Author’s Construct based on V. Ostrom et al. (1961), Parks and Oakerson
(1989), Williamson (1971)
In terms of direction a municipality can choose to collaborate vertically, where
different levels of government collaborate or horizontal, where the players are local and
represent multiple interests within a particular region Agranoff and McGuire (2003).
Beyond bilateral and multilateral arrangements, collaborations can be either bilateral –
where agreements exists between two local governments – or multilateral – where
agreements exists between more than two local governments. The freedom to rely on
these combinations of service delivery arrangements allows local governments to
maximize efficiency by arriving at the optimal combination of in-house production,
contracting, and collaborations that provide the optimal satisfaction to citizens.
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Modes of Exchange in Collaborative Governance
The different modes of service delivery within the US local government are akin
to Williamson’s (1991) model of market-hybrid-hierarchy trichotomy. As depicted in
Figure 2, on one extreme is a typical market economy that operates on arms-length
contracts. Cities that operate this market form of government provide services to
residents through either direct purchase from a private producer or through franchise –
authorizing a private producer to operate a service and charge fees (Shrestha, 2008). On
another extreme is a hierarchy (consolidated government) that undertakes in-house
production within a unified governmental structure. Consolidation is a form of territorial
rescaling, where local governments forgo their individual autonomies in pursuit of
common regional government agenda (as was the case of the Louisville/Jefferson County
Metro Government). Nevertheless, evidence suggests that consolidation as a mode of
government is more popular in theory than in practice. There are few consolidated
governments in the US today because local governments resist losing their autonomy
(Brierly, 2004; Carr & Feiock, 2004).
Between private markets and hierarchies is the domain of collaborative
governance. Collaborative mechanisms applied here may include pay-for-service
agreements, mutual aid agreements, joint agreements, voluntary special districts and
regional partnerships (Shrestha, 2008). The underlying difference in these exchange
mechanisms is the obvious increase in autonomy as a municipality shifts from market
forms of exchange to hierarchies.
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Figure 2
Forms of Exchange Mechanisms
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Source: Author’s Construct based on Williamson (1991) and Shrestha (2008)

Special districts and regional partnerships are institutionalized forms of
collaborative governance which are in most cases created through statutory mandates
(Leroux, 2006). Because these forms of exchange mechanisms are not voluntary,
participating municipalities have very limited autonomy in decision making (Feiock &
Scholz, 2010; Gerber & Gibson, 2005). The analyses in this dissertation did not include
these two forms of collaboration.

Voluntary Interlocal Service Agreements (ILAs)
Voluntary Interlocal Agreements (ILAs) have been widely researched by different
disciplines in the past decades (c.f. Andrew, 2009; Andrew & Hawkins, 2012; Andrew et
al., 2015; Carr et al., 2009; Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Collins, 2006; Feiock, 2007, 2009;
Frug, 2002; Gillette, 2001, 2005; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; MacManus & Caruson, 2008;
Reynolds, 2003; Taylor & Bassett, 2007; Wood, 2006; Zeemering, 2008a). Zeemering
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(2008a, p. 731) describes ILAs as crucial “features of contemporary local government
management.” In its basic form, a voluntary ILA is an arrangement established
voluntarily between local governments for the purposes of producing or providing public
services across interjurisdictional boundaries. From this logic any ILAs that are crafted in
response to state mandates and funding requirements are not classified as voluntary and
therefore not covered under this study. They may either be formal, where contracts are
signed or informal where agreements are based on trust and a simple handshake (Andrew
2009a; Atkins 1997).
Pay-for-service agreements, joint service agreements and mutual aid agreements
collectively constitute the main voluntary interlocal service agreements adopted by the
majority of cities and counties in the United States (Advisory Council on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1985; Friesema, 1971; ICMA, 1997; Thurmaier & Wood,
2002; Zimmerman, 1973). They may exist between only two localities or crafted among
multiple agencies and local governments (Andrew & Hawkins, 2012).
A pay-for-service contract comes into effect when a buyer municipality enters
into a legally binding agreement with a producer municipality such that the buyer
municipality pays for the delivery of a particular service produced by the producer
municipality. What differentiates pay-for-service contracts from private contracting is the
element of integration. Integration refers to the achievement of collaboration between
organizations. It encompasses not only cooperation (alignment of interest) but also
coordination (alignment of actions) (Camerer & Knez, 1996, 1997; Foss, 2001; Heath &
Staudenmayer, 2000). Because private contracting typically involves arm’s length
bidding processes the interests and actions of the buyer municipality and the private
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contractor may not necessarily be aligned. Shrestha (2008) has noted that owing to their
relatively longer life spans, pay-for-service contracts enable buyer and producer
municipalities to protect their interests from short term political and administrative
changes. This is in contrast to private markets where buyer municipalities protect their
interests by entering into short-term deals so as to take advantage of better future deals in
the market (Shrestha, 2008).
A joint service agreement (JSA) is a form of collaboration that allows two or
more units of government to jointly plan, finance and deliver a service to citizens
(Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2008). They may include agreement options such as joint
service provision, sharing of equipment or facilities, joint planning, tax revenues sharing
and coordination of land-decisions (Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations,
1985; Nunn & Rosentraub, 1997; Zeemering, 2008b). A JSA enables individual
municipalities to contribute to each other’s welfare by contributing resources into a
generalized pool from which all municipalities obtain benefits. Through a JSA,
collaborating municipalities are able to cut costs and take advantage of economies of
scale in the production and provision of public services (Advisory Council on
Intergovernmental Relations, 1985; Collins, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Morton et
al., 2008). The difference between a JSA and a pay-for-service contract is that in a JSA
each participant in an agreement is actively involved in the production of the service,
whereas in a pay-for-service contract jurisdiction A produces the service with its own
resources and supplies it to jurisdiction B at a purchase price. The structure of JSAs
varies in terms of primary tasks, mutual responsibilities and liabilities of collaborating
parties. Compared to pay-for-service contracts, JSAs are the preferred mode of delivery
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for most cities and counties in the nation (The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1985)
Mutual aid agreements are service arrangements devised by two or more
jurisdictions in which each jurisdiction agrees to provide a service to the other at the
provider’s expense whenever the need arises (Friesema, 1971; Lynn, 2005; Nicholson,
2007). They form the majority of informal (undocumented) forms of agreements
available to local governments in the United States. Informal mutual aid agreements
generally occur as handshake deals among governing officials, verbal confirmations,
implicit understandings and mutual adjustments – where a city takes into account
programs of neighboring cities as part of its planning process (Friesema, 1971). Because
the responsibilities created by mutual aids are established on good faith, they “…are
operative only when certain conditions come into existence and they remain in operation
only so long as these conditions are present” (Bollens & Schmandt, 1965, p. 77).
In a typical mutual aid agreement, jurisdiction A is under no legal obligation to
provide assistance to jurisdiction B when the need arises especially if providing such aid
would be injurious to jurisdiction A’s personnel or would reduce jurisdiction A’s capacity
to provide the service to their own residents (Shrestha, 2008). Friesema (1971) noted that
although these informal forms of exchange cannot be easily quantified their knowledge
helps to understand a broader perspective on collaborations in general. The Advisory
Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1985) has observed that documented contracts
are more popular amongst cities and counties with larger populations whilst
undocumented contracts are more common in cities and counties with populations under
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2,500. In this study, a collaborating local government is one that uses any one or more of
these three types of ILAs.

Restrictive vs. Nonrestrictive Interlocal Agreements (ILAs)
Based on the nature of enforcement mechanisms that go along with an agreement
two types of ILAs can be identified – restrictive and nonrestrictive. Restrictive ILAs are
agreements that are generally safeguarded by a binding formal contract to offset
opportunistic behavior (Andrew & Hawkins, 2012; Gillette, 2001). The contents of an
ILA may range from simple task descriptions to full details of the nature and scope of
individual responsibilities. Andrew et al. (2015, p. 403) have suggested that for a
restrictive ILA to be more effective it must be supported by “…(1) specific state statutes
or (2) legal or economically defensible local ordinances.”
There are several advantages of having a restrictive ILA. First a legally binding
agreement ensures that efforts of all parties are coordinated in a stable and decisive
manner (Hawkins & Andrew, 2011; Kettl, 2013; Lynn, 2005). Also, by clearly specifying
the outcomes, rules and regulations of a contract before its inception, ex-post monitoring
costs are ultimately minimized. Most states (including Kentucky) have statutory
procedures that help to streamline interlocal collaborative activities of local governments.
These interlocal collaboration statutes provide information and expectations necessary for
local governments to make strategic choices (Advisory Council on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1985; Andrew, 2010).
Nonrestrictive ILAs are those agreements that are enforced through standards of
professional norms (Frederickson et al., 2004; Wukich, 2014). Local governments,
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especially those that belong to a common county, council of government or area
development district are in constant interaction. Such proximity and regular
communications help generate trust among partnering local government officials, which,
in turn, reduces the need for formal control mechanisms (Shrestha & Feiock, 2009;
Wukich, 2014). Although certain contracting clauses are important to ensure contract
performance and to hold contracting partners accountable, local governments generally
have similar goals in the provision of quality urban services. This engenders confidence
that a contracting partner will not act contrary to expectations or to the detriment of
another jurisdiction. Another reason why local governments may be motivated to opt for
nonrestrictive agreements is the cost element associated with restrictive ILAs. Evidently,
monitoring restrictive ILAs involves enforcement costs. Thus having a flexible less
restrictive arrangement allows partnering local governments to adapt to local
circumstances at less to no cost. The disadvantages however lie in the fact that
nonrestrictive ILAs may lead to “standard principal–agent dilemmas” (Andrew et al.,
2015, p. 403).
For the purposes of this study I will concentrate solely on restrictive ILAs
available from the Kentucky Department of Local Government database.

Toward a Theory of Collaboration
As a concept, collaborative governance draws from several grounded theories
including group theory (Bentley, 1949), logic of collective action (Olsen 1965),
prisoner’s dilemma/game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Dawes, 1973), the commons research
(E. Ostrom, 1990) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1971). For the purposes
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of this study I will restrict the review of concepts to the logic of collective action,
transaction cost economics and network theory.

The Logic of Collective Action
Collective action as defined by Mancur Olson (1965) in his book, The Logic of
Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups, is an action undertaken by a
group of individuals to provide a good/service for the benefit of everyone in that group.
The novelty of Olsen’s logic is the revelation that just because all individuals in a group
would gain from a collective action does not necessarily mean they would act in
agreement to achieve that objective (Olson, 1965, p. 2). Rational self-interested
tendencies of humans mean that individuals will often abstain from expending personal
resources to ameliorate social problems, assuming that someone else will bear the burden.
This inclination to “free ride” on the actions of others is the essence of the collective
action problem. In order for individuals to voluntarily contribute resources of time, effort,
or money to a particular cause, they must hold the perception that the personal benefits of
doing so will outweigh the costs. The solution, Olson concludes, is small group size,
coercion or the institution of some other special incentives to make individuals act in
their common interest.
Based on Olson’s theory different schools of thought have posited their own
interpretation of what constitutes collective action. Public choice theorists (e.g., V.
Ostrom et al., 1961) have opined that individuals have greater voluntary incentives to
support collective action within smaller homogenous local government jurisdictions than
within metropolitan governments. This view is different from that of scholars within the
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metropolitan governance and new regionalism camps (Downs, 1994; Feiock, 2004, 2005;
Rusk, 2013). Feiock (2004, p. 6) has argued that “local governments can act collectively
to create a civil society that integrates regions across multiple jurisdictions through a web
of voluntary agreements and associations and collective choices by citizens”. Instead of
competition as the public choice theorists suggest, Feoick contends that local
governments can simultaneously engage in competitive and cooperative interactions in a
system of decentralized governance.

Transaction Cost Economics
Collaboration in any form and at every level involves transactions. For every
transaction undertaken by individuals, private organizations or public organizations
(including cities) there are associated costs that differ depending on “…the nature of the
transaction and on the way that it is organized” (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p. 28).
Transaction costs can take many forms including search costs, measurement costs,
administrative costs, information processing costs and maladaptation costs (Williamson,
2010). These costs emanate from two intrinsic problems – coordination and motivation
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). The coordination problem is mainly a communication
problem. It occurs when there is difficulty in transmitting information across various
layers of authority. It may also occur when decision makers have insufficient or
inaccurate information to make the most cost effective decisions. The motivation problem
on the other hand results from imperfect commitment from participants in an agreement.
In situations where it is difficult to motivate partners the prospects of exchange are low. It
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stands to reason that for efficiency gains, it is best to adopt the exchange arrangement that
minimizes coordination and motivation problems.
Ultimately, whether a firm (government) operates as a hierarchy, market or hybrid
form of institutional structure is largely determined by five related characteristics:
1. the specificity of investments required to conduct transactions
2. the difficulty of measuring performance in the transaction
3. the frequency with which similar transactions occur and the duration or period of
time over which they are repeated
4. the complexity of transactions and the uncertainty about what performance will be
required
5. the connectedness of the transaction to other transactions (Milgrom & Roberts,
1992)

Network Theory
Network theory provides another analytical lens for understanding the American
administrative state. In the field of public administration for example, network analyses
have often been used to examine (1) the role of public managers (Agranoff & McGuire,
2001; Mandell & Keast, 2007); (2) decision making and policy outcomes (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2003; Mandell & Keast, 2007; Provan & Milward, 2001) and (3) systems of
public service delivery (O'Toole, 1997; Provan & Milward, 2001).
In network analyses, collaborative governance may be conceptualized as a system
of actors (nodes) and relationships (ties) (c.f. Borgatti et al., 2013; Carrington et al., 2005;
De Nooy et al., 2011; Kadushin, 2012; Newman, 2010; Robins, 2015; Scott, 2012; Scott
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& Carrington, 2011; Valente, 2010; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Actors are disjoint
entities such as individuals within a group, departments within a municipality, cities
within a county or counties within a state (Leroux, 2006; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Relational ties on the other hand are conduits for the flow of material (e.g; funds,
equipment or personnel) and non-material (e.g; information) resources between actors
(Leroux, 2006; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Network theory further suggests that
relational ties are not mutually exclusive. In other words an actor’s position in one set of
relations may be connected with positions in other networks.
Unlike transaction cost economics theory that conceptualizes collaboration as a
purely economic function, network theory relies on social norms, trust and obligations to
explicate collaborative networks (Lackey et al., 2002; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002).
Frederickson (1999) has observed in the public sector that compared to elected officials,
administrators tend to work collectively owing to the fact that they share common norms,
values, rules, and practices. Brown and Potoski (2003, 2005) have further observed that
past interactions help build trust and credibility which in turn reduce the risk of
opportunistic behavior.

Theorizing Interlocal Collaboration
The model of interlocal collaboration adopted in this study draws from Feoick’s
(2004, 2005, 2013) institutional collective action (ICA) framework. The ICA framework
combines Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action with Williamson’s (1991) transaction
cost economics to explicate the circumstances under which local governments and private
institutions work together in a voluntary manner to solve shared problems. The ICA
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framework explores transaction risk reduction strategies and examines mechanisms for
incentivizing and sanctioning voluntary collaboration across jurisdictions and
organizations (Andrew et al., 2015; Feiock, 2013; Feiock & Scholz, 2010).
Similar to the ICA framework, the model of collaboration in this study is
premised on the assumption that local governments are interested in maximizing their
utility from interlocal exchanges. It further assumes that all other things being equal,
rational and self-interested local governments are willing to solve mutual problems by
assessing for themselves the costs and benefits of participating in voluntary exchanges
compared to private markets or hierarchical exchange mechanisms. Where the benefits of
interlocal cooperation outweigh the costs, rational and self-interested local governments
assess the different modes of voluntary interlocal agreements that produce the largest
utility gains. In a nutshell, local governments will only act collectively if they are
“…persuaded that their jurisdiction will enjoy benefits in excess of the costs” (Leroux,
2006, p. 9).
The ICA framework reveals that collaborating jurisdictions are prone to both exante and ex-post transaction costs in interlocal exchanges (Andrew, 2008b; Andrew &
Hawkins, 2012; Feiock, 2013; Hawkins, 2009). Ex-ante transaction costs occur prior to
the implementation of an agreement. They include costs associated with the lack of
(asymmetry) information, negotiations, and writing of agreements. Ex-post transaction
costs occur after the implementation of an agreement. They include costs associated with
the monitoring and enforcement of agreements against any future conflicts. When
transaction costs are low, the prospects for institutional collective action are enhanced
and vice versa. The magnitude of transaction costs is however dependent on the
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specificity and measurability of the service in question. Services that have low asset
specificity and at the same time easily measurable have low transaction costs. Such
services provide opportunities for collaboration (Feiock, 2005).
Additionally, conditions within the exchange environment such as differences in
attributes of transacting parties, changes in the exchange conditions as well as behavioral
and environmental uncertainties can also increase the transaction costs and make
interlocal exchange riskier (Shrestha, 2008). Safeguarding agreements against such
potential influences may increase the enforcement costs for participating municipalities.
Indeed, these transaction risks not only influence the decisions of local governments to
adopt collaboration but also the extent, direction and pattern of collaboration. The
sections that follow explain in detail how transaction costs and exchange embeddedeness
help mitigate the transaction risks in interlocal exchange.

Microanalytics of Transaction Costs in Collaborative Governance
Governance, according to the “commons” theory (E. Ostrom, 1990), is a means to
mitigate conflict, infuse order, and thereby realize mutual gains from voluntary exchange.
Examining the microanalytics of transactions put forward by Williamson (2002) and the
thesis on alternative paths to new regionalism by Savitch and Vogel (2000) provides a
theoretical lens for understanding why municipalities engage in different exchange
mechanisms.
From the perspective of Savitch and Vogel (2000) collaboration is a reflection of
the regional path on which a local government is treading. Local governments in the US
are situated in five regional structures – consolidated regions, multitierd regions, linked
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functions regions, complex network regions and public choice (polycentric) regions.
Consolidated and public choice regions are akin to Williamson’s (2002) hierarchy and
markets respectively while multi-tiered, linked functions and complex network regions
are akin to hybrids.

The Multi-tiered approach suggests a two-tier governmental

structure – metropolitan level system maintenance service structure and city level
lifestyle service structure. The first tier of government represents a single metro wide
government for “system maintenance” services such as water, sewers and mass transport.
Whilst the second represents municipal-level management of lifestyle services such as
parks and recreation, elementary and secondary school education. Linked functions also
known as functional consolidation is an approach that sustains a pattern of functional
relations between a city and its county. Relations could be pay-for-service agreements,
joint service agreements or mutual aid agreements. Complex networks is an approach that
encourages several independent local government of similar cohort to engage in
voluntary collaboration through “multiple, overlapping webs of interlocal agreements”
for their mutual benefit (Savitch and Vogel 2000, 164). From a transaction cost
perspective the rudiments of identifying these alternative modes of regional governance
are the attributes of the service being transacted – including asset specificity and service
measurability.

Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is the ease with which an asset used for transaction ‘A’ can also
be used for transaction ‘B’. Where a party makes an investment in assets that cannot be
easily redeployed to other locations for different users and uses, such an investment is
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asset specific. The specificity of assets can lead to ‘hold-up’ problems in transactions.
The more specific a collaborative agreement is, the more dependent the producing party
is and the higher the risk of opportunistic behavior. Thus transactions that require specific
investments require strictly enforced contracts to protect parties against early termination
or renegotiation of the terms of the agreement (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).

Service Measurability
Service measurability refers to the ease with which service outputs can be
measured (Brown & Potoski, 2003). It also refers to how costly, impossible or only partly
possible service outputs can be measured (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Ostrom et al.
(1961) have observed that where performance can be easily measured, local governments
are able to streamline the production or provision of a public good and hold producing
agencies accountable for any inconsistencies in performance. However, where
performance is difficult to measure it is hard to sanction bad behavior and incentivize
good behavior. Measurement difficulty therefore creates opportunity for manipulation
and free riding at others’ cost. As explained by the institutional collective action
framework, services with outputs that are difficult to measure may be less likely
candidates for inter-local collaborations because they involve increased transaction costs.
As measurement difficulty decreases, transaction costs in turn decrease and local
governments are significantly more likely to collaborate with other local governments.
But when service outputs become difficult to measure, local governments are
significantly less likely to collaborate with other local governments.
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A number of studies on interlocal collaboration have found that transaction costs
associated with the negotiation, operation and enforcement stages of an agreement are
major barriers to collaboration (c.f. Andrew, 2008a; Dusin et al., 2009; Feiock & Scholz,
2010; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; LeRoux et al., 2010; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Shrestha, 2008;
Wood, 2008). Studies by Brown and Potoski (2003) and Andrew (2009) and Carr et al.
(2009) have further indicated that services with high asset specificity and measurement
difficulty are less likely to be provided through interlocal collaboration because of the
risk of opportunistic behaviors on the part of collaborating municipalities.
Some studies have found empirical support for the service measurability
hypothesis but not asset specificity (e.g. Shrestha, 2008). Yet still others like Andrew
(2005) have found no evidence in support of either the asset specificity or service
measurability theses.

Network Embeddedness – How Well Do You Know Your Partner?
It has been established from TCE theory that information asymmetry represents
one of the main sources of transaction costs. Unlike the “economic man” who acts
rationally because he has complete knowledge and anticipates the consequences that will
follow on each choice, the “administrative man’s” knowledge of consequences in
transactions is usually fragmentary. In short, the administrative man is bounded rational
(Simon, 1945). In the absence of complete knowledge, municipalities are bound to make
decisions on service delivery mechanisms with varying levels of uncertainty. The
uncertainty associated with the behaviors and actions of collaborating parties leaves room
for opportunistic behaviors (Feiock, 2013). To offset such opportunistic behaviors,
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jurisdictions may consider entering into agreements with partners who form part of their
social network rather than with strangers (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954).
In his seminal paper; “The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the
Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect”, Uzzi (1996) explains that
organizational networks operate in an embedded logic of exchange that promotes
economic performance through resource pooling, cooperation, and coordinated
adaptation. This means that to curb both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs due to
information asymmetry, municipalities can rely on relational mechanisms through
repeated interaction and reciprocity to facilitate exchange (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi,
1996; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).
This is because reciprocal and repeated interactions allow local government
partners to gain first-hand experience about each other’s behavior (Shrestha, 2006;
Granovetter, 1985). Having access to such behavioral information can serve as a tool for
controlling each other and thereby limiting any tendencies for opportunistic behavior
(Shrestha, 2006; Williamson, 1996). The special relations developed from reciprocal and
repeated interaction over time allows collaborating parties to develop credibility and trust
(Andrew, 2009; Coleman, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004; Wukich, 2014) which in turn
reduce both ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs (Olberding, 2002; Poppo & Zenger,
2002; Schneider et al., 2003; Uzzi, 1996). Local governments that interact frequently also
have the opportunity to develop internal code of conduct and informal communications
that help to streamline their actions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1994;
Parks et al., 1996; Valley et al., 1998).
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Through this process of exchange embeddedness the behavior of collaborating
partners becomes more predictable for existing and subsequent exchange (Gulati &
Gargiulo, 1999) creating a basis for increased interlocal cooperation (Gerber & Gibson,
2005).

Towards A New Model of Interlocal Collaboration
The review of literature so far has explored three grounded theories of
collaboration – logic of collective action, transaction cost economics theory and the logic
of network embeddedness. These theories explain how local governments can offset
transaction risks in interlocal exchanges. Transaction cost theory and the logic of
collective action are based on the economic assumption of rationality while the logic of
network embeddedness is based on trust and credibility developed through reciprocity
and repeated interactions. TCE and the logic of collective action help to explain the
decision to collaborate but fail to resolve ex-post behavioral uncertainties. On the other
hand the logic of network embeddedness helps to explicate ex-post behavioral
uncertainties but fails to provide an economic (cost-benefit) approach to collaboration.
The model of interlocal exchange adopted in this study thus incorporates elements of all
three theories to explain exchange patterns and relationships in collaborative governance.

Number of Collaborating Partners: Bilateral vs. Multilateral Relations
One of the most relevant questions about collaboration regards the effect of the
number of partners on collaborative behavior. In his magnum opus The Logic of
Collective Action, Mancur Olson (1965) demonstrated that the number of partners in a
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group is inversely related to a group’s ability to achieve collective action. In other words
as the size of a group increases, the probability of the group achieving a collective action
decreases (E. Ostrom, 2010, p. 157). This thesis, according to Olson, is based on two
reasons – “the free rider” problem and the problem of high transaction costs. As the size
of a group increases so does the difficulty of accounting for individual contributions
towards the provision of a public good. Group members who perceive that their noncontributions will neither be noticed nor affect the likelihood that a good will be provided
will free ride. Second, Olson suggests that as group size increases transaction costs
regarding internal negotiations, writing of agreements and enforcement of agreements
also increase.
Following Olson’s influential work, scholars from various disciplines have sought
to further investigate the effects of group size on collaborative behavior albeit with mixed
results. Whilst some scholars have found evidence in support of Olson’s position that the
relationship is negative (c.f. Baland & Platteau, 1999; Dawes et al., 1977; Grujić et al.,
2012; Komorita & Lapworth, 1982; Nosenzo et al., 2013; E. Ostrom, 2005; Vilone et al.,
2014), others have found the relationship to be rather positive (c.f. Agrawal & Chhatre,
2006; Haan & Kooreman, 2002; Isaac et al., 1994; Masel, 2007; Martin McGuire, 1974;
Szolnoki & Perc, 2011). Yet still others have found that the relationship between group
size and collaborative behavior is either ambiguous (c.f. Chamberlin, 1974; Esteban,
2001; Oliver & Marwell, 1988; Pecorino & Temimi, 2008), non-significant (c.f. Gautam,
2007; Rustagi et al., 2010; Sandler, 1992) or curvilinear (Agrawal, 2000; Agrawal &
Goyal, 2001; Chamberlin, 1974; Cinner et al., 2013; Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1970;
Hardin, 1982; Pecorino, 1999; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Yang et al., 2013).
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Indeed, the general agreement amongst scholars who support the curvilinear
hypothesis is that large groups increase transaction costs while small groups usually do
not possess the resources and capacity required for effective collective action. Thus,
medium-size groups collaborate better than either small or large groups. Some of these
scholars have also established that group size and the likelihood of collaboration are
indirectly related (Chamberlin, 1974; E. Ostrom, 2001). This means that differences in
group size first influences other variables like one’s marginal contribution in a group,
which in turn influences collaborative behavior.
E. Ostrom (2010) observed that one reason why there have been inconsistent
patterns in previous literature is the failure of scholars to distinguish between what
constitutes excludable (substractive) and non-excludable (nonsubstractive) public goods.
In a substractive public good scenario, the use of a good by individual A reduces the
benefits for individual B. Thus increasing the number of participants increases the extent
of “nonoptimality” (E. Ostrom, 2010). In a nonsubstractive public good environment, the
use of a good by individual A does not impact the benefits individual B receives.
Increasing the number of participants in a nonsubstractive good environment thus allows
participants to enjoy a larger collective pool of additional resources. The underlying
hypothesis is that when “a good has pure jointness of supply, group size has a positive
effect on the probability that it will be provided” (Marwell & Oliver, 1993, p. 45).
In interlocal exchanges, local governments are also confronted with the decision
of choosing between bilateral (two local governments) or multilateral (more than two
local governments) agreements. A bilateral relationship may be advantageous in certain
situations because it provides a basis for a more cohesive relationship between
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transacting jurisdictions in terms of social capital, mutual solidarity, and trust (Coleman,
1988). Partners involved in bilateral relations are better positioned to gain first-hand
information and experience about each other (Granovetter, 1985). The prospect of
repeated dealings further strengthens mutuality between transacting jurisdictions and help
reduce the prospects of supplier (producer) opportunism.
However, repeated interaction and familiarity may also serve as an incentive for
opportunism. A buyer (provider) government concerned with this familiarity problem and
the potential threat of a single supplier’s (producer) opportunistic behavior may choose to
enter into an agreement with several suppliers (producers) or several buyers (providers)
of the same service. Multilateral agreements have an advantage over bilateral agreements
in that they are less susceptible to interruption in service supply. In situations where one
supplier government fails to provide a particular service other supplier governments may
be available to fill the lag in supply. Again, in a multilateral agreement, the credibility of
a supplier (producer) municipality may serve as a self-restraint against any opportunistic
temptation (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). There are however certain limitations to multilateral
agreements. Since administrative (procurement and financial) procedures, number of
personnel, qualifications and training vary across jurisdictions, negotiating joint service
and mutual aid agreements can be complex when multiple partners are involved (Haddow
et al., 2013; Krueger & Bernick, 2010; Scorsone, 2006).

Direction of Collaboration: Vertical vs Horizontal Relations
Besides choosing the number of potential partners, local governments are also
confronted with the dilemma of deciding the direction in which to collaborate. They may
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decide to enter into horizontal agreements with other municipalities, private or nonprofit
entities or alternatively, they may also be motivated to establish vertical relationships
with county governments (Andrew et al., 2015). In a heuristic way, Figure 3 shows how
transaction cost influence the direction of collaboration in different regional
governance/government structures – markets, complex networks, linked functions, multitiered governments and consolidations (Savitch & Vogel, 1996).

Figure 3
A Heuristic Model of Regional Governance
Markets

Hybrids
(collaborative governance)
Linked
complex
Multifunctions
networks
tiered

Public choice

Hierarchy
Consolidation

Public choice (m)

Transaction Costs

Collaborative governance (g)
Consolidation (q)
CC

Vertical
collaboration

B
Horizontal
collaboration

D

A
k0

k1

k2

Asset Specificity / Service Measurability

Source: Author’s construct based on Williamson (2002, p. 181), Savitch and Vogel
(2000) and Shrestha (2008)
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As shown in Figure 3, the burdens of bureaucracy make consolidated
governments more costly at k0. From asset specificities k0 to k1 public choice m(k) is more
cost effective than collaborative governance g(k) and consolidation q(k) by reason of its
flexibility and adaptability. Beyond asset specificity k1, collaborative governance g(k)
becomes more cost effective than public choice m(k) and consolidation q(k). Local
governments are therefore better off with collaborative governance, g(k) at this stage.
Collaborative governance mechanisms could either be complex networks, linked
functions or multi-tiered. Within these three strata of collaborative governance, complex
networks are the closest to public choice and so attract lower asset specificities. Multitiered governments are associated with higher asset specificities because they are closest
to consolidation. Beyond k2 where asset specificity is at an optimum level, local
jurisdictions are likely to adopt consolidation q(k) as it becomes less costly than public
choice m(k) and collaborative governance g(k). In other words m(k) > g(k) > q(k) because
consolidated governments have successfully coordinated and adapted to the transaction
process at this stage. This illustration indicates that collaborative governance is most
advantageous at intermediate range of asset specificity (k1 < k2). It also indicates that
within collaborative governance g(k), jurisdictions have a choice of interacting
horizontally – with local governments of comparable powers – or interacting vertically –
with local governments of different powers (Kenyon & Kincaid, 1991). From Figure 3, it
can be inferred that at lower levels of asset specificity cities are better off engaging in
horizontal collaborations. As asset specificities increase, jurisdictions may turn towards
vertical collaboration (with a county for example) for efficiency gains.
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This rudimentary setup can also be extended to explicate the impact of service
measurability on collaborative behavior. The basic argument propounded here is that
vertical collaboration is preferred to horizontal collaboration as a public service becomes
highly asset specific and difficult to measure, ceteris paribus. Prior studies have found
that when municipalities rely on vertical collaboration they gain from higher levels of
regulatory enforcement and a minimal cost of monitoring potential defectors (Andrew,
2009; Feiock, 2007, 2009; Scholz & Wang, 2006).

Determinants of Interlocal Collaboration: Empirical Background
Over the past two decades there have been a series of attempts to find empirical
explanations to the factors that determine interlocal collaboration. Despite these attempts
scholars are yet to agree on a general theory or model of collaboration. Some of the
variables that have been examined in prior research include asset specificity, service
measurability, labor/capital intensity, reciprocity and recurrence of exchange. Other
demand-side factors such as local fiscal capacity, changes in a local government’s
population, the amount of personal income, property wealth of residents, form of
government, demographic characteristics and social networks have equally been
empirically tested by different scholars albeit with inconclusive results (e.g. Krueger &
McGuire, 2005; Leroux, 2006; Post, 2002; Rawlings, 2003; Shrestha, 2008; Wood, 2006;
Zeemering, 2007). Granted that results from prior studies are inconclusive, it is worth
finding out if the variables that have been tested elsewhere in the US are significant
determinants in the case of Kentucky.
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Fiscal Factors
For a long time fiscal capacity has remained the number one cited determinant of
interlocal collaboration (e.g. Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985;
Bartle & Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Leroux, 2006; MacManus &
Caruson, 2008; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Sonenblum et al., 1977; Stein, 1990). Studies
highlighting fiscal capacity have often suggested that governments faced with depleting
property tax base and state funding are better off engaging in interlocal collaboration
rather than in-house production (Carr et al., 2007). Prior studies stressed further that by
entering into collaborative agreements local governments are able to achieve cost savings
and scale economies on services that are mostly capital intensive or have high start-up
costs (Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991).
Notwithstanding these supporting arguments, empirical testing of the fiscal
capacity variable by different scholars has produced mixed results (e.g. Adhikari, 2015;
Bartle & Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Stein, 1990; Wood, 2004). Those
who have found empirical support for the hypothesis include Wood (2004) and Krueger
and McGuire (2005). In a study of 46 city managers in the Kansas City Metropolitan
Area, Wood (2004) found that eighty (80) percent of the cities using interlocal
agreements achieved cost savings whilst eighty three (83) percent achieved economies of
scale. In similar study of 2,825 U.S. cities, Krueger and McGuire (2005) found that tax
revenue per capita and federal grants per capita were significant in determining both the
decision to collaborate and the extent of collaboration.
Other studies have demonstrated that fiscal capacity in terms of per capita taxable
value does not significantly influence the decisions to collaborate even when
jurisdictional differences in population, land area, and demographic characteristics are
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considered (e.g. Carr et al., 2007; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Thurmaier, 2005;
Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). Yet still, others have shown that cities participate in
collaborative arrangements irrespective of fiscal capacity. In a study of 1,290 local
governments in Iowa Thurmaier (2005) for instance found that local governments do not
necessarily engage in collaborative exchanges because they want to cut production costs.
Rather, local governments collaborate because they want to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness (managerial values) in service delivery.
Obviously, this variability of findings results from the lack of a standard measure
of fiscal capacity. Prior studies have often used different measures including local
property tax per capita, personal income per capita, and government spending as proxies
for fiscal capacity. It is however not clear whether these proxies accurately capture the
true financial situations of the municipalities they study.

Labor Intensive versus Capital Intensive Services
Findings from prior research suggest that the decision to collaborate is also
largely influenced by the characteristics of the service in question. One of such
characteristics is the labor intensity – capital intensity dichotomy. Labor intensive
services are services that require continuous levels of staffing. Examples include police,
fire corrections and health services. Because production costs for labor intensive services
do not decrease as volumes increase, realizing economies of scale in labor intensive
services is difficult (Leroux, 2006). Capital intensive services on the other hand are
services that have high start-up costs. Examples include highway construction, housing,
parks, sewage, gas and water distribution. Capital intensive equipments and materials are
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usually less expensive when purchased in large quantities thus they tend to produce
economies of scale. The general argument therefore is that local governments are more
likely to collaborate on services that are capital intensive, and less likely to collaborate on
services that are labor intensive. In a study of 140 metropolitan areas, Post (2002) found
that while both labor intensive and capital intensive service related collaborations occur
in almost all geographically dense regions, collaborations in capital-intensive services
occur at higher rates than labor-intensive services.

System Maintenance versus Lifestyle Services
In his book, Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social Access Approach, Oliver
Williams (1971) drew attention to what he perceived as the “lifestyle model” of
metropolitan service delivery. The lifestyle model dichotomizes public services provided
in metropolitan areas as either systems maintenance functions or lifestyle functions.
Systems maintenance functions are services that provide the needed infrastructure
essential for maintaining the health and safety of residents. These include sewer, water
distribution, solid waste disposal, storm water management, and roads. Lifestyle services
are services that usually influence residential location decisions (Andrew et al., 2015).
They include services that provide comfort and satisfaction to a select group of residents,
particularly residents of upper-middle class suburbs who enjoy affluent lifestyles.
Lifestyle goods include parks and recreation.
At the regional level, this dichotomy of services suggests a two-tier governmental
structure – metropolitan level system maintenance service structure and city level
lifestyle service structure. The first tier of government represents a single metro wide
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government for “system maintenance” services such as water, sewers and mass transport.
Services provided at this level require a vertical form of collaboration (see Figure 1)
between local governments and a county or consolidated government. The second
represents municipal-level management of lifestyle services such as parks and recreation,
elementary and secondary school education. Lifestyle service structures require
horizontal forms of collaboration between local governments, service districts, for-profits
and non-profits.
A number of studies (Rawlings 2003; Wood 2004; LeRoux 2006) have employed
Williams's (1971) social access model to explain interlocal collaboration based on the
general hypothesis that public managers are more likely to collaborate on “system
maintenance” services than they would on “lifestyle” services. The assumption here is
that cities are more likely to make efficiency gains and enjoy economies of scale by
delivering system maintenance services on a larger scale than lifestyle services. But here
again empirical findings have been inconclusive. Some studies (e.g. Julnes & Pindur,
1994; Rawlings, 2003; Savitch & Vogel, 1996) found interlocal service collaboration to
be much more common for systems maintenance functions than lifestyle services. Others
(e.g. Wood, 2006) found no supporting evidence.
In his study of 1,848 collaborative service delivery arrangements among 46 cities
and counties in the Kansas City Metropolitan area Wood (2006) found no evidence to
support the notion that local governments are mostly inclined to collaborate on systems
maintenance functions than lifestyle goods. He noted rather that collaboration for lifestyle
goods and services occur at almost the exact same rate as cooperation for systems
maintenance functions.
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Form of Local Government
To a large extent, the decision to produce or provide a service is very political.
This is why the form of government – Mayor Council, Commission or Council Manager
– is an important factor for explaining decisions to participate in interlocal collaboration
(Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Sonenblum et al., 1977). The council-manager form of
government in particular has been identified as a very significant predictor of
collaboration because of the common values and norms city managers share (Bartle &
Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Thurmaier &
Wood, 2002; Wood, 2006).
In a strict sense elected public officials like mayors and councilmen are not as
administrative minded as city managers. As public administrators, city managers perform
the role of public entrepreneurs promoting new innovations whilst generating political
support. Frederickson (1999) notes that public administrators are able to perform this
entrepreneurial role because they usually have a long tenure compared to other elected
city officials. They therefore hold shared professional values and norms that are geared
towards development. This inner drive motivates them to cooperate with each other as
long as it leads to the development of their respective municipalities. In addition to
Fredrickson’s position, Stein (1990) surmises that professional administrators are also
motivated to collaborate in order to enhance their professional reputation.
Other findings indicate that although influential, the council-manager form of
government is only significant in cases of private contracting but not for interlocal
service agreements (Brown & Potoski, 2003).
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State Rules
Prior studies have noted that the ‘‘the decision calculus of local leaders’’ is often
influenced by the legal environment within which their municipalities exist (Krueger &
Bernick, 2010, p. 714). Thus state legal environments can either support or inhibit
collaborative efforts. Local governments that exist in home rule states for example have
the autonomy to decide which possible combinations of service delivery methods are
beneficial to its citizens. Additionally, the presence of an Interlocal Cooperation Act
provides the legal backing required to reduce the potential risks of opportunism in
interlocal collaborations. Municipalities that have this legal backing are more confident to
engage in interlocal agreements.
Prior studies that examine the limiting aspects of state laws have however
surmised that instruments like state mandates and conditional grants-in-aid tend to
promote competition and conflict rather than collaboration among autonomous
jurisdictions (McEntire & Dawson, 2007; Volden, 2007).

Resident Income Levels
Previous research has also examined the influence of residents’ income levels on
collaborating patterns (c.f. Leroux, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Shrestha, 2008).
The notion that low income levels are a general indication of poverty and fiscal stress is
the basis for the resident income hypothesis. Just like the fiscal capacity hypothesis, the
prevailing argument here is that communities with majority low income residents are
more likely to collaborate rather than produce services in-house. The reverse is also true
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for communities with high median incomes. Communities that are wealthy are more
likely to produce services in-house because they can afford them.
Yet again, empirical evidence shows that the conventional median income
hypothesis is inconclusive. In a study of public safety services for example Andrew
(2010) found that high median household incomes are linked to less reliance on interlocal
collaboration. Other studies by Morgan and Hirlinger (1991), LeRoux and Carr (2007)
and Leroux (2006) have shown that the relationship between per capita income and
interlocal collaboration is nonlinear. This means that both wealthy and poor communities
are equally likely to use interlocal contracting arrangements. In the case of wealthy
communities collaboration occurs because they can afford to experiment with alternative
service delivery arrangements (Leroux, 2006).

Density of Local Governments
The density of local governments is another factor that has been identified in
previous studies as a determinant of interlocal collaboration. Post (2004) has noted that
the higher the density of local governments in an area the higher the potential for policy
spillovers. Interlocal collaboration serves as a control mechanism against free-riding in
such instances. The density of local governments also impacts the transaction costs
(negotiation, operation, enforcement) of collaboration. Where local government densities
are low, proximity to collaborating partners is limited which may increase the cost of
negotiations, operations and enforcement of agreements. The reverse is also true when
local governments are highly dense.
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Social Networks
Local government decision-makers interact and share information on a daily basis
at the professional and social levels. Memberships of associations like the International
City and County Management Association (ICMA), Council of Governors (COG), Area
Development Districts (ADDs), League of Cities and a host of other regional
organizations enable municipalities to share common norms, values, rules, and practices.
These relationships help build trust which is critical for interlocal collaboration (Kettl,
2013; Roberts, 2008). Thurmaier and Wood (2002) have shown empirically, that social
relations among city managers positively influence interlocal collaboration. Similarly,
Brown and Potoski (2003) and Lackey et al. (2002) have shown that where administrators
belong to similar professional associations they tend to collaborate.
Based on the theory of network homophily (Lazarfeld and Merton, 1954), also
known as “like-me” hypothesis, other researchers have hypothesized that municipalities
are more likely to interact with those whom they have more in common. Empirical
evidence on this logic is however been mixed. Similar to previous findings by Dye,
Leibman, Williams and Herman (1963) five decades ago, Foster (1998) has found that
central cities and suburbs that share common social and economic characteristics are
more likely to collaborate in a number of services than are central cities and suburbs with
dissimilar attributes. More recent studies have shown that having similar social and
economic characteristics only influences collaboration under less restrictive contractual
arrangements (Andrew, 2009). In a study of interlocal public safety agreements in
Florida, Andrew and Hawkins (2012) found that communities that have similar levels of
median income are more likely to collaborate under mutual aid agreements. He also
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found that contrary to the ICA proposition, racial heterogeneity rather than homogeneity
encourages collaboration. In his analysis he found that communities with a higher
percentage of white population were more likely to enter into agreements that have
localities with a lower percentage of white residents.

Research Gaps
Given the fact that contemporary public management theory has accepted the
principle that managers must operate across organizations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003)
and that solving seemingly complex social problems of today require mechanisms that
are more inclusive and more adaptable (Alter & Hage, 1993), an in-depth study on the
exchange relationships and patterns in collaborative governance is a worthy exercise.
Similar to Andrew’s (2009) previous observation there are currently three
dominant research approaches to understanding the dynamics of voluntary interlocal
collaboration. The first approach addresses interlocal collaboration as one of the many
alternatives of service delivery, including in-house production, provision by private
enterprises, provision by county, and provision by other municipalities (Brown &
Potoski, 2003; Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; LeRoux & Carr, 2007). The likelihood of a
municipality choosing to collaborate or otherwise is treated as a variable which is
dependent on other social, economic and political explanatory variables. Scholars who
adopt this approach often theorize with Williamson’s (1971) transaction cost economics
or Feoick’s (2005, 2009, 2013) institutional collective action framework. A second
approach draws on network values such as credibility, trust and reciprocity to explain
how different interlocal networks foster and support collaboration (Andrew, 2009;
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Shrestha, 2010; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). The third approach relies on more qualitative
case studies and interviews to explore the internal dynamics of collaboration (Taylor &
Bassett, 2007; Zeemering, 2008a).
A review of literature on the three dominant research approaches has revealed
inconclusive evidence on why local governments and institutions choose to collaborate.
Specifically, the review of literature has shown that prior studies are limited in the
following ways:

1) A limited number of researches exist that analyze the determinants of collaboration
for different public services (e.g., public safety, economic development, infrastructure
etc).
2) A limited number of researches exist that examine the determinants of collaboration
based on the number of collaborating partners (e.g., bilateral versus multilateral
relations)
3) A limited number of researches exist that examine the determinants of collaboration
based on direction (vertical versus horizontal relations). Although in recent times
research.

This dissertation will address these gaps by analyzing the patterns of collaboration on
a number of services in the state of Kentucky.
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Conclusion
Collaborative governance has gained popularity over the past two decades. There
have been a series of attempts to find empirical explanations to the question of what
factors determine interlocal collaboration. Whilst some progress has been made by
scholars in answering this question there is yet to be consensus on a general methodology
and theory of collaboration. Beside asset specificity, service measurability, reciprocity
and recurrence of exchange, other factors including fiscal capacity, labor/capital
intensity, form of government, demographic characteristics and social networks have
been empirically tested by different scholars albeit with inconclusive results. Although
results from these studies are inconclusive, it is worth finding out if these factors are
significant determinants in the case of Kentucky. The next section outlines the research
questions, hypotheses and methodology for the study
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter begins with an outline of the research questions for the study. Based
on the extant theoretical and empirical research, six hypotheses are derived to answer
these research questions. The final part of the chapter outlines a study design and
methodology for operationalizing the research hypotheses.

Research Questions
The objective of this research is to address some of the gaps identified in the
theoretical and empirical research. Following the literature review in chapter II, the
following research questions have been identified for further enquiry:

1. Direction of Collaboration
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate vertically?
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate horizontally?
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to
collaborate with other cities (horizontal collaboration)?
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to
collaborate with a county (vertical collaboration)?
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2. Number of collaborating partners
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate bilaterally?
o On what services do cities mostly collaborate multilaterally?
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to
collaborate with only one partner – city, county, special district, non profit or
for-profit (bilateral collaboration)?
o Which network factors have the strongest influence on a city’s decision to
collaborate with two or more partners (multilateral collaboration)?

Hypotheses
Consistent with prior research that utilizes the transaction cost (Andrew, 2009;
Andrew & Hawkins, 2012; Carr et al., 2009; Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Hawkins, 2009) and
network embededdness (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005) theory my central argument in
this study is that a municipality’s direction of collaboration and the number of
collaborating partners are largely influenced by (a) the characteristics of the services and
(b) the embeddedness of its network.
Six (6) research hypotheses have been developed from this general argument to
address the questions raised in the previous section. A list of these hypotheses and their
theoretical and empirical justifications are provided in the sections that follow.

Hypotheses Examining the Direction of Collaboration
The literature review in chapter II established that municipalities are confronted
with the challenge of deciding what direction they want to collaborate. Savitch & Vogel’s

52

(1996) three typologies of regional governance suggest that jurisdictions have a choice of
interacting horizontally – with local governments of comparable powers – or interacting
vertically – with local governments of different powers. Furthermore, the literature has
established that the decision to collaborate or not also depends on the characteristics of
the service in question such as asset specificity and service measurability (Brown &
Potoski, 2003, 2005; Carr et al., 2009; Feiock, 2007; Ferris & Graddy, 1986; Shrestha,
2010; Williamson, 1985, 2010). When an investment made in a particular locality is
difficult to redeploy to another location or reusable for another purpose such an
investment is considered to have high asset specificity. To offset any opportunistic
behaviors on the part of partners, local governments may be better off collaborating
vertically on asset specific services.
Service measurability refers to the difficulty associated with measuring and
monitoring the outcomes of services delivered (Brown & Potoski, 2003). Service
outcomes that are relatively difficult to measure carry greater uncertainty. Thus at higher
levels of service measurability cities are better off engaging in vertical collaborations. As
services become easy to measure, jurisdictions may turn towards horizontal collaboration.
Based on these arguments I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: Cities are more likely to collaborate vertically on services that have high
levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.

Hypothesis 2: Cities are more likely to collaborate horizontally on services that have
lower levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.
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Hypotheses Examining the Number of Collaborating Partners
Review of both theoretical (Coase, 1937; Feiock, 2005, 2008, 2013; Williamson,
1991) and empirical (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2008) literature
has demonstrated that transaction costs associated with information search, negotiations,
and enforcement of negotiations are hindrances to collaboration.

The literature has

further indicated that the magnitude of these transaction costs is dependent on the
specificity or measurability of the service in question. Where assets are specific in
transactions, redeployment is difficult and the likelihood of opportunistic behavior is
high. In the same vein, where services outputs are difficult to measure, costly, impossible
or only partly possible to measure (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), it is hard to provide
effective incentives or sanctions. The resultant effect is opportunistic behavior.
The extant literature on collective action has also demonstrated that the number of
partners in a collaborative arrangement has an indirect relation with collaborative
behavior (Chamberlin, 1974; E. Ostrom, 2001). The number of partners in a collaborative
arrangement first influences latent factors like asset specificity and service measurability,
which in turn influence collaborative behavior. Where services have high levels of asset
specificity and measurement difficulty cities are better off with multilateral agreements.
In a large group any costs associated with opportunistic behavior are distributed amongst
all members. The final cost burden carried by a participating city therefore becomes low.
Based on these arguments I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3: Cities are more likely to collaborate multilaterally on services that have
higher levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.
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Hypothesis 4: Cities are more likely to collaborate bilaterally on services that have lower
levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.

Hypotheses Examining Network Embededness
The theory of network embededdness in public administration suggests that the
primary impulse of cities to collaborate is not purely based on economic reasons but
rather the innate tendency to establish norms of reciprocity (Lackey et al., 2002;
Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). This argument is consistent with Frederickson’s (1999)
administrative conjunction thesis that surmises that administrators tend to work
collectively owing to the fact that they share common norms, values, rules, and practices.
Empirical evidence from recent studies also point to the fact that social relations among
city managers and specialists such as being part of the same council of governments tend
to support the use of interlocal agreements (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Lackey et al., 2002;
Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). According to Brown and Potoski (2003, 2005), previous
interactions build trust and credibility which ultimately reduce the risk of opportunistic
behavior. This is especially relevant in agreements where services are asset specific, and
difficult to measure.
Social network theory also suggests that a local government’s position in one set
of relations can further reinforces positions in other sets of relationships. That is to say
that past collaborations within a network can breed future collaborations due to trust and
credibility. In line with these arguments I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5: Repeated interaction in the past between transacting jurisdictions
increases the likelihood of collaboration.
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Hypothesis 6: Collaboration in other service areas has a positive effect on the likelihood
of collaborating on the service in question.

Table 3.1 provides a summary of the transaction characteristics of services included in
this study. It also shows the expected patterns of collaboration.

Table 3.1
Characteristics of Services and Expected Pattern of Collaboration
Service
Public Safety
Emergency 911 Radio Communications
Emergency Medical Response (EMS)
Fire Protection & Response
Police Protection/ Law Enforcement
Emergency Disaster Planning
Economic Development
Planning, Zoning, Building Inspection
&Code Enforcement
Financing/Economic Development
Enterprise Zone & Industrial
Development
Tax Collection & revenue sharing
Parks and Recreation/ Tourism
Equipment Sharing
Information sharing/ Human Resources
Sharing
Infrastructure
Housing & energy
Cable & internet
Sewer System
Telecommunications
Water

Asset specificity/ Vertical/
Bilateral/
measurability
Horizontal Multilateral
HA_EM
LA_DM
HA_DM
HA_DM
HA_DM

Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
Vertical

Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral

HA_DM

Vertical

Multilateral

LA_EM
HA_DM

Horizontal
Vertical

Bilateral
Multilateral

HA_EM
LA_DM
LA_EM
LA_EM

Vertical
Vertical
Horizontal
Horizontal

Multilateral
Multilateral
Bilateral
Bilateral

HA_EM
HA_EM
HA_EM
HA_EM
HA_EM

Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
Vertical
Vertical

Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral

HA_DM: High Asset Specificity, Difficult to Measure HA_EM: High Asset Specificity, Easy to Measure
LA_DM: Low Asset Specificity, Difficult to Measure LA_EM: Low Asset Specificity, Easy to Measure

Source: Author’s Construct based on Brown and Potoski (2001 p. 31) and Andrew and
Hawkins (2012, p. 467)
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Methodology
The study is mostly quantitative. Hypotheses 1 to 4 are analyzed using descriptive
statistics whilst hypotheses 5 to 6 are analyzed using binary logistic regressions.

Units of Analysis
The analyses cover all ‘home rule’ cities in Kentucky with populations above 230
people. It excludes larger jurisdictions like Louisville Jefferson County Metro and
Lexington Fayette Urban County governments. These two governments were left out of
the study because their population sizes and government structure could potentially affect
the variability in the data. Additionally, the service provision relationships between the
consolidated Louisville Metro government and independent municipal governments
within the consolidated entity are legally determined rather than the product of voluntary
collaborative behavior. Cities of population below 230 were also left out of the analysis
because sparsely populated municipalities are generally known to rely heavily on their
counties for services, thereby limiting their potential for collaboration. Thus out of the
three hundred and thirty four (334) incorporated cities in Kentucky, two hundred and
ninety nine (299) representing 90 percent of municipalities were included in the final
analyses.

Data
In this study, collaborative governance is examined under three service functions
namely; public safety, economic development and Infrastructure. Public safety in
particular is important to study because it is one of the major components of local
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government budgets (Carr & LeRoux, 2005). Economic development and infrastructure
were included in the study because they represent the core service agreements in
Kentucky beside public safety. Other relevant local governments services like public
works (road maintenance, snow plowing, street sweeping) and waste management (solid
waste disposal and recycling) were excluded from this research because evidence
suggests that most municipalities including the ones in Kentucky usually outsource these
services to private contractors.
Interlocal service agreement data on public safety, economic development and
infrastructure were sourced from the Kentucky Department of Local Government
(KDLG) online database. Pursuant to KRS 65.210 – 65.300 (the Interlocal Cooperation
Act), all interlocal cooperation agreements entered into between cities, counties, charter
counties, urban-county governments, and sheriffs (and any combination thereof) are
submitted to the Department of Local Government for approval. The KDLG data
provides specific information on the nature and content of all collaborative agreements
including:
(1) The name of the service to be performed;
(2) Collaborating parties involved;
(3) The location of the service to be performed;
(4) The means of payment of the cost of the service

Of the six hundred and forty eight (648) interlocal agreements reported by the Kentucky
Department of Local Government between years 2000 and 2013, three hundred and sixty
two (362) representing 55.9 percent were selected and used in the analyses. The
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remaining two hundred and eighty six (286) agreements that were left out of the analyses
were either inter-county agreements, grant based agreements or agreements between any
of the 119 cities excluded from the study.
Data pertaining to median income and population were sourced from the US
Census Bureau. Data on local government fiscal capacity was sourced from the annual
financial reports from the cities submitted to the Department of Local Government and
retained and distributed by the Kentucky League of Cities.

Research Design
The hypotheses in this study were tested as two separate but reinforcing parts.
Hypotheses 1 to 4 address general transaction characteristics (asset specificity and service
measurability) while hypotheses 5 and 6 address network embeddedness. Consistent with
Brown and Potoski (2001, 2003, 2005) and Andrew & Hawkins (2012) the services were
examined under four transaction characteristics: (1) low asset specificity and low service
measurability, (2) high asset specificity and high service measurability, (3) low asset
specificity but high service measurability, and (4) high asset specificity but low service
measurability. Appendix 1 provides details of services under each category.
Descriptive statistics were used to measure the degree to which the four
transaction characteristics fall under vertical, horizontal, bilateral and multilateral
collaborations. Similar methodological approaches have been utilized by Dustin, Jones
and Levine (2009) in their extensive study of local government collaboration in Ohio as
well as Caruson and MacManus (2010) in their study of interlocal emergency
management collaboration in Florida. Hypotheses 5 and 6 were examined using a binary
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logistic model. The sections that follow explain the variables and statistical tests used in
analyzing hypotheses 5 and 6.

Variables
Four variables, each addressing the mode of collaboration (vertical, horizontal,
bilateral, multilateral), serve as dependent variables in the analyses. Not participating in
any mode of service delivery serves as the reference category in all models. The
dependent variables were examined under three service categories: (1) public safety (2)
economic development and (3) infrastructure development. Table 3.1 provides details of
the services included in each service category.
Service agreements amongst cities are not mutually exclusive; this means that a
city may collaborate with another city in law enforcement whilst collaborating with
another city on fire service. Where a city maintains two or more agreements in a service
category, one service was randomly selected and used in the analyses. In public safety,
thirty (30) samples were selected under bilateral collaboration; twenty four (24) samples
were selected under multilateral collaborations; forty eight (48) samples were selected
under vertical collaborations while six (6) samples were selected under horizontal
collaborations. In economic development thirteen (13) samples were selected under
multilateral collaborations; twelve (12) samples were selected under bilateral
collaborations; eleven (11) samples were selected under vertical collaborations while
three (3) samples were selected under horizontal collaborations. Finally, in infrastructure,
seven (7) samples were selected under multilateral collaborations; sixteen (16) samples
were selected under bilateral collaborations; twenty five (25) samples were selected
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under vertical collaboration while one (1) sample was selected under horizontal
collaboration.
Two (2) predictor variables were included in the model to explain the dependent
variables in each of the three (3) service categories. These predictor variables are
collaborations in other services and repeated interaction. Control variables in the model
are variables that appeared as predictors of interlocal collaboration in previous studies
(Carr et al., 2007; Leroux, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Post, 2002, 2004; Shrestha,
2008). They are fiscal capacity, county density, city population, median household
income, county seat and form of government. Table 3.2 provides a summary of all
variables included in the study.
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Table 3.2
Summary of Variables
Variables
Dependent Variables
Direction of service delivery
(vertical / horizontal)

Variable Construction

A dichotomous variable scored 1 when a city uses a
particular mode of delivery, 0 otherwise

No. of Collaborating partners
(bilateral / multilateral)
Predictor Variables
Collaboration in other services
Repeated interaction
Controls
Fiscal Capacity
Density of municipalities

Number of other services a city is collaborating in.
The number of years a city has been collaborating
Cities’ own source revenue measured in dollars per
capita (Kentucky League of Cities, 2015)
The number of municipalities in a City’s county per
square 100 square miles

City population

A city’s population in thousands transformed into
natural log (American Community Survey 5 Year Data,
2009 - 2013)

Median household income

Natural log of median household income in dollars
(American Community Survey 5 Year Data, 2009 2013)

County seat

A city that also serves as seat of county government
(Kentucky League of Cities)

Form of government

A dichotomous measure indicating whether a city has
council mayor (1) or otherwise (0).
Source: Author’s construct, 2016

Measures of the Variables
Dependent Variables
Two variables addressing interlocal collaboration in terms of number of partners
(bilateral and multilateral) and two variables addressing interlocal collaboration in terms
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of direction (vertical and horizontal) were used as dependent variables. A bilateral
agreement in this study is one that has only two partners of which one is a municipality. It
could either be an agreement between two municipalities, between a municipality and a
county or between a special district and a municipality. A multilateral agreement is one
that has three or more partners of which at least one is a municipality. A vertical
agreement is one that has at least one city and one county partner. A horizontal agreement
is one that has at least two local governments. Available data on interlocal agreements
from the Kentucky Department of Local Government website provided indication of
which agreements are bilateral, multilateral, vertical or horizontal.

Predictor Variables
Two (2) predictor variables derived from the theoretical and empirical literature
on exchange relations are included in the model. These variables are other collaborations
and repeated interaction.
A review of the literature on social network theory suggested that a local
government’s position in one set of relations could further reinforce positions in other
sets of relationships (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005). This means that if city A
collaborates with city B on law enforcement, city A is likely to collaborate with city B or
any other local government (city or county) on emergency services. Put in simple terms,
collaboration breeds further collaborations. Other collaborations in this study was
operationalized as the total number of other collaborative agreements a city has signed
beside the one under consideration.
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It was further established in the literature review section that by engaging in
repeated exchanges jurisdictions are able to develop trust, credibility and commitment in
their transactions (Andrew, 2009; Coleman, 1988; Frederickson et al., 2004; Wukich,
2014). Parties involved in a long, close relationship with frequent interactions have
opportunities to develop understandings and routines that reduce the need for explicit
planning to coordinate their actions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Such interpersonal
relations arising out of exchange relationships help mitigate transaction risks and
facilitate further interlocal exchange (Olberding, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Schneider
et al., 2003; Uzzi, 1996). Through this process of exchange embeddedness the behavior
of collaborating partners becomes more predictable for existing and subsequent
exchanges (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) creating a basis for increased interlocal cooperation
(Gerber & Gibson, 2005). In this study, repeated interaction was operationalized as the
period of time a city has maintained an agreement within a particular service category.
Ultimately, the longest running agreement was the focal point in each service category.

Control Variables
The control variables employed in this study are variables that were used as
predictors of interlocal collaboration in prior studies but ended up producing competing
results (e.g. Carr et al., 2007; Leroux, 2006; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Post, 2002, 2004;
Shrestha, 2008). They are fiscal capacity, county density, city population, median
household income, county seat and form of government.
Previous research has often hypothesized that the state of a city’s fiscal health can
influence its decision to either collaborate or not. Where cities are fiscally stressed due to
low internal revenue mobilization or limited federal and state revenue inflows tended to
64

engage in collaborative arrangements with other local jurisdictions in order to manage
fiscal hardships (Agranoff & McGuire 2003; Stein, 1990). In this study fiscal capacity
was operationalized as a city’s own source revenue measured in dollars per capita.
Federal and state funds were left out of the model for some reasons. First, federal and
state funds are generally outside the control of cities. Since cities do not necessarily
control what these funds are used for, this study does not regard them as good proxies for
examining the internal financial capacity of cities. Additionally, the provision of federal
and state funds is usually tied to specific statutory mandated collaborative arrangements.
Since this study is focused solely on voluntary collaborations, federal and state funds
were left out of the model. The own source revenue variable was transformed into
revenue per capita by dividing every city’s revenue over its total population. This
transformation was to done in order to normalize the distribution and avoid biases in the
model.
The density of municipalities in a city’s county was also included in the analyses
to control for regional fragmentation (Andrew & Hawkins, 2012). The study assumes that
cities that belong to a common county have a shared value system and responsibility
towards development. Where more cities exist per 100 square miles of a county, there is a
high likelihood for close collaboration and vice versa. This assumption is supported by
Post’s (2002) observation of increased local cooperation in higher density regions. In this
study the density of local governments was determined by dividing the number of
general-purpose local governments in a County by its land and transforming the result
into a natural log.
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Previous research has established that the size of a city’s population provides a
general indication of its potential for achieving economies of scale (Joassart-Marcelli &
Musso, 2005; Nelson, 1997). City size was operationalized as the total population of the
city in year 2013. The city size variable was transformed by natural log to normalize its
distribution.
A city’s median household income provides a general indication of its residents’
effective demand for services. Evidence suggests that both high income and low income
municipalities engage in interlocal collaboration for a variety of reasons (Morgan &
Hirlinger, 1991). Because municipalities with lower household incomes tend to lack
lifestyle services like recreational parks, golf courses, and country clubs they are more
likely to be motivated for collaboration in order to gain access to lifestyle services. Rich
communities, on the other hand, may engage in increased cooperation for higher quantity
or quality of services because of their ability to pay. A natural log of the median
household income derived from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-year
estimates was utilized in the analysis.
County seat status reflects the vertical collaborative capacity of a city. Where a
city serves as county seat, it is more likely to have a high concentration of county
administrative offices. The proximity of county officials to city officials may in turn
increase the likelihood of collaboration. This implies that a city that serves as county seat
may have less need for collaboration with other cities outside the county. The county seat
variable was operationalised as a dichotomous variable coded 1 where a city is a county
seat and 0 where it is not.
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The form of government characterizes the political and administrative conditions
of a city. Frederickson’s (1999) administrative conjunctions theory suggests that
professional administrators are more likely to support interlocal collaboration because of
their long tenure and shared public service ethics. A council-manager form of
government is often considered efficiency oriented (Ruhil et al., 1999) and
entrepreneurial (Teske, Schneider, and Mintrom, 1995) compared to a mayor-council
government. Interlocal cooperation is expected to be more likely in municipalities with a
council-manager government than in cities with a mayor-council or commission form of
government. In this study, form of government was modeled as a dummy variable with
council-manager form of government serving as reference category.

Statistical Analysis
Variables in the data were analyzed using both descriptive statistics and binary
logistic regression models. A number of statistical diagnostics were carried out to ensure
results of the logistic regression models are more robust. To ensure that predictor
variables are independent of each other collinearity statistics were sought and examined
using tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIFs). Any values of the tolerance statistic
less than 0.1 and any values of the VIF statistic over 10 was regarded as a problematic
variable. Collinearity in the final model was low; variance inflation factors (VIFs) ranged
from 1.029 to 2.168 (any value below 10 was deemed acceptable). There were no outliers
or influential cases in the models.
Linearity of association between the dependent variables and the interval/ratio
predictors was examined using scatterplots of studentized residuals and a loess fit line.

67

Curved patterns indicated a non-linear effect of the variable. All scatterplots in the final
models indicated there were only linear relationships between the independent variables
and studentized residuals.
In the initial analyses, the standard error for city manager form of government
under horizontal collaboration in economic development appeared inflated due to the
small number of respondents with a city manager form of government. The decision was
made based on size to combine commission and city manager forms of government into a
single category under economic development. After doing so, there were no longer any
inflated standard errors.
Goodness of fit statistics (Cox and Snell r2, Nagelkerke r2 and p-value) were
reported for each model. Both full and parsimonious models were sought, with the
parsimonious model being produced via backwards selection (p > .10 to exit). In order to
improve the interpretability of the intercept in the models, all interval/ratio and dummy
independent variables were mean-centered prior to completing the analyses. The model
used in the analyses was of the form:
ln

1

Conclusion
Research on collaborative governance has doubtlessly flourished over the past
three decades. Notwithstanding its increasing popularity there are still certain gaps in
literature that merit further investigation. Based on the review of existing theoretical and
empirical literature the study focused attention on two of these research gaps – direction
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of collaboration and number of collaborating partners. A number of research questions
have been raised and six (6) hypotheses developed to address these research gaps.
Consistent with previous studies, the analyses in this research are done using both
descriptive statistics (for hypothesis 1 – 4) and binary logistic regression (for hypotheses
5 – 6). The next chapter tests the research hypotheses.
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CHAPTER IV
PATTERNS OF INTERLOCAL COLLABORATION: ANALYSES OF DATA

Introduction
This chapter shows the results of the data analyzed in the study. It begins with a
brief overview of interlocal governance and interlocal collaboration in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. This is followed by descriptive statistics of the dependent
variables. The final part of this chapter describes the full and parsimonious models of the
binary logistic regressions.

Overview of Local Governance in Kentucky
Kentucky has 418 general purpose local governments (Kentucky League of
Cities, 2012, p. 4). Prior to the enactment of the Municipal Reclassification Reform Act,
House Bill 331 (KRS 81.005), Kentucky had six classes of cities. This included one first
class city, 13 second class cities, 18 third class cities, 117 fourth class cities, 111 fifth
class cities and 158 sixth class cities. Effective January 1, 2015, pursuant to Kentucky
House Bill 331,

the arbitrary classification system with six classifications changed to

two classes – first class and home rule cities. The city of Louisville remained the only
first class city by virtue of being a consolidated local government. Lexington became a
home rule city although it still maintains all responsibilities and privileges under its
urban-county statutes.
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Kentucky cities operate under one of four forms of government – mayor
alderman, mayor council, commission or city manager. Only the Louisville Metro
government operates under the mayor-alderman form of government due to its first class
status. Fifty three (53) percent of cities operate under mayor-council, forty two (42)
percent operate under commission form of government while five (5) percent operate
under the city manager form (Kentucky League of Cities, 2012, p. 9).

General Overview of Interlocal Agreements in Kentucky
“If the cities of Kentucky had a slogan, it would probably be ‘doing more with less ...’”
Sarah Razor, (2011, p. 26)

Interlocal collaboration is a widely recognized mode of service delivery in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. Its application spans from public safety, infrastructure
development, watershed management to equipment and revenue sharing. Part of the
reasons for this popularity is the fact that governments at all levels recognize they could
do “…more with less…” for their citizens through joint efforts (Razor, 2011, p. 26). Most
importantly, the laws governing local governance in Kentucky provide legitimacy to
interlocal activities. The Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act (KRS 65.210-65.300) is a
law that has, since its creation in 1962, authorized cities to engage in collaborative
agreements for the purposes of performing a function or delivering public services. As a
guide, the Act requires all interlocal agreements to specify the duration of an agreement;
the composition and powers of participants; how a joint activity will be financed as well
as the proper procedures for termination and disposal of properties. For an agreement to
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be legally binding, it must be approved by the Kentucky Department for Local
Government.
Between 2000 and 2013, Kentucky recorded a total of 648 interlocal service
agreements. Out of this figure, 627 were voluntary agreements while the remaining 21
were agreements that were tied to state grants. Of the 627 voluntary agreements 68 were
inter-county agreements while the rest (559) were interlocal service agreements that had
at least one city as a participant. Mutual aid agreements constituted 3.8 percent of the 559
interlocal service agreements. The remaining 96.2 percent were either pay-for-service or
joint service agreements.

Results
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are reported in Tables 4.1 and
4.2. Out of the 648 interlocal service agreements recorded between years 2000 and 2013
by the Department of Local Government, 362 agreements representing 55.9 percent were
included in the survey. The 362 agreements used in this study include collaborative
agreements between cities selected for the study and cities excluded from the study. The
286 agreements that were excluded from the study comprises inter-county agreements,
grant based agreements and agreements signed between any of the 119 cities that were
left out of the study. According to Table 4.1, of the three service categories examined in
this study, public safety services rank the highest (41.1 percent) in terms of interlocal
collaboration. This is followed by economic development (35.4 percent) and
infrastructure services (23.5 percent) in that order.
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With respect to the direction of collaboration, Table 4.1 indicates that economic
development exhibits a greater association (93.8 percent) with vertical collaboration
whilst public safety exhibits a greater association (18.8 percent) with horizontal
collaboration. Moreover, in terms of the number of partners in an agreement,
infrastructure exhibits a greater association (85.9 percent) with bilateral collaboration
whilst public safety exhibits a greater association (27.5 percent) with vertical
collaboration.
Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables
Service category

% of N

Direction
Vertical Horizontal
81.2%
18.8%

(41.1 %)
Public Safety
(149)
(35.4%)
93.8%
Economic
Development
(128)
(23.5%)
89.4%
Infrastructure
(85)
N = 362
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016

No. of Partners
Multilateral Bilateral
27.5%
72.5%

6.2%

14.8%

85.2%

10.6%

14.1%

85.9%

Consistent with Brown & Potoski (2001, 2003, 2005) and Andrew & Hawkins
(2012) Table 4.2 examines the dependent variables under four transaction characteristics:
(1) high asset specificity and difficult to measure, (2) high asset specificity but easy to
measure (3) low asset specificity and easy to measure (4) low asset specificity but
difficult to measure. The results displayed in Table 4.2 indicate that of the four
transaction categories examined in this study, services that are highly asset specific but
easily measurable rank the highest (41.4 percent) in terms of interlocal collaboration.
Services that are highly asset specific and at the same time difficult to measure rank
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second (40.1 percent) followed by services that have low asset specificity but are difficult
to measure (11.1 percent) and services that have low asset specificity but are easy to
measure (7.4 percent) in that order.

Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables based on Transaction Characteristics
Service Category

Direction
No. of Partners
Vertical Horizontal Multilateral Bilateral
high asset specificity and difficult to measure
Fire Protection & Response
Police Protection/ Law Enforcement
Emergency Disaster Planning
34%
6.1%
11%
29.1%
Planning and Zoning Building
Inspection &Code Enforcement
Enterprise Zone & Industrial
Development
high asset specificity but easy to measure
Emergency 911 Radio Communications
Tax Collection & revenue sharing
Housing & energy
38.4%
Cable & internet
Sewer System
Telecommunications
Water
low asset specificity and easy to measure
Financing/Economic Development
Equipment Sharing
10%
Information sharing/ Human Resources
Sharing

3%

8.8%

1.1%

1.1%

32.6%

10%

low asset specificity but difficult to measure
Emergency Medical Response (EMS)
5.2%
2.2%
0.9%
6.5%
Parks and Recreation/ Tourism
N = 362
87.6%
13.4%
19.9%
80.1%
Source: Author’s Construct (2016) based on Brown and Potoski (2001. Pg. 31; 2003)
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With respect to the direction of collaboration, table 4.2 shows that services that
are highly asset specific but easy to measure exhibit a greater association (38.4 percent)
with vertical collaborations while services that are highly asset specific but difficult to
measure exhibit a greater association (6.1 percent) towards horizontal collaborations.
Additionally, with respect to the number of collaborating partners, services that are
highly asset specific but easy to measure exhibit a greater association (32.6 percent) with
bilateral collaborations while services that are highly asset specific but difficult to
measure (11 percent) exhibit a greater association with multilateral collaborations.

Descriptive Statistics for Predictor and Control Variables
Descriptive statistics on the predictor and control variables are reported in Table
4.3. On the average a municipality has collaborated repeatedly for 7.5 years on 2.5
services. Additionally the results indicate that the average municipality generates $93.27
as revenue from sources other than the county or state. This revenue figure was unusually
low because of missing data on revenue. The uniform financial report provided by the
Kentucky League of Cities did not provide revenue information for all the cities included
in the study.
Table 4.3 indicates that on the average 1.9 cities exist per 100 square miles of a
county. The average number of people in a city is 4,502 whilst the median municipal
household income is $37,118.70. Amongst the 299 cities included in the study, 37.8
percent serve as county seats. With respect to form of government, 29.4 percent of cities
operate a commission form of government, 64.2 percent operate a mayor-council form of
government while 6.4 percent operate a city manager form of government.
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Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables
Variable
Predictors
Collaboration in other services
Repeated interaction

Min.

Max.

Mean

Std. Dev.

0
0

26
14

2.50
6.89

3.52
5.30

Controls
Fiscal Capacity
0
6,804
93.27
497.94
Municipal Density
0.2
9.82
0.02
0.02
City population
232 61,488 4,501.81 7,980.67
Median household income
11,813 106,250 37,118.70 15,046.44
County seat
0
1
0.38
0.49
Form of government
0
2
0.77
0.55
N = 299
1
Reference group
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016

Regression Models on the Direction of Collaboration
Tables 4.4 to 4.9 display the results of the final regression models that examine
the direction of collaboration in public safety, economic development and infrastructure.
Analyses are based on the parsimonious models.

Public Safety
Vertical Collaboration
As shown in Table 4.4, four variables (collaboration in other services, repeated
interaction, county density and median income) out of the eight predictor variables are
significant predictors of the likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety. The
parsimonious model explained approximately 35 percent of the unexplained variance of
the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.354; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.504).
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Table 4.4
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Vertical Collaboration in
Public Safety1
Variables

Parsimonious model2

Full model

Odds ratios
Collaboration in other services 1.709***
1.122**
Repeated interaction
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
1.000
County Density
0.535***
City population (ln)
0.975
Median income (ln)
0.392
County seat
1.226
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
1.378
City Manager
1.378
Constant
0.210***

S.E
0.112
0.042
0.000
0.137
0.189
0.620
0.424
0.462
0.867
0.210

Odds ratios S.E
1.724***
0.105
1.127**
0.041
0.525***

0.130

0.321*

0.559

0.212***

0.208

1

Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.35 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.511
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.354 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.504 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of vertical collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
Table 4.4, shows that each one-unit increase in the number of other service
collaborations is associated with a 72.4 percent increase in the likelihood vertical
collaboration in public safety. Additionally, each one-year increase in the duration of
collaboration is associated with a 12.7 percent increase in the likelihood vertical
collaboration in public safety. However, each one-unit increase in the number of cities
per 100 square miles is associated with a 47.5 percent decrease in the likelihood of
vertical collaboration in public safety. Again, each dollar increase in median income is
associated with a 67.9 percent decrease in the likelihood of vertical collaboration in
public safety.
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Horizontal Collaboration
The results of regression models predicting the likelihood of horizontal
collaboration in public safety are displayed in Table 4.5. Five variables (collaboration in
other services, repeated interaction, median income, county seat and mayor council) out
of the eight predictor variables employed in the model are significant. The parsimonious
model explained approximately 30 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent
variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.296; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.568).

Table 4.5
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Horizontal
Collaboration in Public Safety1
Variables

Full model

Parsimonious model2

Odds ratios S.E
Odds ratios S.E
Collaboration in other services 1.356**
0.091
1.387***
0.080
1.170**
0.076
1.176**
0.077
Repeated interaction
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
0.999
0.002
County Density
1.111
0.091
City population (ln)
0.825
0.274
5.617**
0.871
7.433**
0.751
Median income (ln)
County seat
0.454
0.684
0.293**
0.595
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
2.919
0.760
2.933*
0.569
City Manager
0.681
1.571
0.031***
0.465
0.033***
0.467
Constant
1
Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.301 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.579
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.296 and Nagelkerke R2 =0 .568 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of horizontal collaboration for the average municipality;
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
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From Table 4.5, it is clear that each one-unit increase in the number of other
service collaborations is associated with a 38.7 percent increase in the likelihood
horizontal collaboration in public safety. Similarly, each one-year increase in the duration
of collaboration is associated with a 17.6 percent increase in the likelihood horizontal
collaboration in public safety. Again, each dollar increase in median income is associated
with a 643.3 percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in public
safety. Also having a mayor-council form of government is associated with a county seat
is associated with a 193.3 percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in
public safety. However, being a county seat is however associated with a 70.7 percent
decrease in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in public safety.

Economic Development
Vertical Collaboration
Table 4.6 provides results of regression models predicting the likelihood of
vertical collaboration in economic development. Four variables (collaboration in other
services, repeated interaction, county seat and city manager) out of the eight predictor
variables employed in the model are significant. The parsimonious model explained
approximately 21 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox
and Snell R2 =0.209; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.352).
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Table 4.6
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Vertical Collaboration in
Economic Development1
Variables

Parsimonious model2

Full model

Odds ratios
Collaboration in other services 1.088
1.147**
Repeated interaction
0.999
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
1.044
County Density
1.065
City population (ln)
1.027
Median income (ln)
3.691**
County seat
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
1.004
Mayor Council
4.292*
City Manager
0.102***
Constant

S.E
0.061
0.046
0.001
0.082
0.197
0.674
0.480

0.542
0.851
0.267

Odds ratios
1.126**
1.153**

S.E
0.056
0.045

3.087**

0.372

4.762**
0.108***

0.591
0.251

1

Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.217 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.365
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.209 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.352 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of vertical collaboration for the average municipality
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
Table 4.6, shows that each one-unit increase in the number of other service
collaborations is associated with a 12.6 percent increase in the likelihood of vertical
collaboration in economic development. Each one-year increase in the duration of
collaboration is associated with a 15.3 percent increase in the likelihood horizontal
collaboration in economic development. Being the seat of county government and having
a city manager form of government are associated with 208.7 percent and 376.2 percent
increase in the likelihood of vertical collaboration in economic development respectively.
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Horizontal Collaboration
Table 4.7 provides results of regression models predicting the likelihood of
horizontal collaboration in economic development. Only the collaboration in other
services and city population variables were significant in this model. The parsimonious
model explained approximately 7 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent
variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.074; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.216).
Table 4.7
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Horizontal
Collaboration in Economic Development1
Variables
Collaboration in other services
Repeated interaction
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
County Density
City population (ln)
Median income (ln)
County seat
Form of Government3
(Commission/city manager =
reference group)
Mayor Council
Constant

Parsimonious model2

Full model
Odds ratios
1.152**
0.992
1.000
1.180
1.710*
0.414
1.340

S.E
0.065
0.149
0.001
0.105
0.412
1.517
0.746

1.194
0.029***

0.642
0.414

1

Odds ratios S.E
1.171**
0.057

1.670*

0.232

0.033***

0.368

Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.082 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.241
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.074 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.216 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of horizontal for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
3
In the regressions commission and city manager forms of government were combined as
one variable in order to reduce the initial inflated standard errors.
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
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Table 4.7 shows that collaboration in other services is associated with a 17.1
percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in economic development.
Again, each one unit increase in the number of people in a city is associated with a 67
percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in economic development.

Infrastructure
Vertical Collaboration
Table 4.8 provides results of regression models predicting the likelihood of
vertical collaboration in infrastructure. One variable (repeated interaction) out of the
eight predictor variables is significant. The parsimonious model explained approximately
23 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2
=0.234; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.339).
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Table 4.8
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Vertical Collaboration in
Infrastructure1
Variables

Full model

Parsimonious model2

Odds ratios
S.E
Odds ratios S.E
Collaboration in other services 1.095
0.057
Repeated interaction
1.269***
0.040
1.264***
0.034
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
0.999
0.001
County Density
0.943
0.072
City population (ln)
0.814
0.168
Median income (ln)
0.801
0.517
County seat
1.281
0.393
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
0.776
0.408
City Manager
0.462
0.777
0.224***
0.207
0.231***
0.200
Constant
1
Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.252 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.365
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.234 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.339 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of vertical collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
From Table 4.8, it can be observed that each one-year increase in the duration of
collaboration is associated with a 26.4 percent increase in the likelihood of vertical
collaboration in infrastructure.

Horizontal Collaboration
The final regression model predicting the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in
infrastructure is shown in Table 4.9. Three variables (repeated interaction, county density
and median income) out of the eight predictor variables employed in the model are
significant. The parsimonious model explained approximately 12 percent of the
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unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.115;
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.407).

Table 4.9
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Horizontal
Collaboration in Infrastructure1
Variables

Full model

Parsimonious model2

Odds ratios
S.E
Odds ratios S.E
Collaboration in other services 1.006
0.089
Repeated interaction
1.652**
0.184
1.522**
0.153
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
1.000
0.001
County Density
1.381**
0.121
1.394**
0.106
City population (ln)
0.533*
0.372
Median income (ln)
0.073**
1.234
0.064**
1.051
County seat
0.633
0.846
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
3.849
1.027
City Manager
45.303**
1.666
0.003***
1.218
0.006***
1.038
Constant
1
Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.134 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.407
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.115 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.349 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of horizontal for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
Reference to Table 4.9 each one-year increase in the duration of collaboration is
associated with a 52.2 percent increase in the likelihood horizontal collaboration in
infrastructure. Each one-unit increase in the number of cities per 100 square miles is
associated with a 39.4 percent increase in the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in
infrastructure. However, each dollar increase in median income is associated with a 93.6
percent decrease in the likelihood of vertical collaboration in infrastructure.
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Regressions Models on the Number of Collaborators
Tables 4.10 to 4.15 show the results of the regression models examining the
number of collaborators in an agreement.

Public Safety
Bilateral Collaboration
As shown in Table 4.10, of the eight predictor variables employed in the model
only collaboration in other services and repeated interaction significantly predict the
likelihood of bilateral collaboration in public safety. The parsimonious model for public
safety explained approximately 25 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent
variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.253; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.405).
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Table 4.10
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Bilateral Collaboration
in Public Safety
Variables

Full model

Parsimonious model2

Odds ratios S.E
Odds ratios S.E
Collaboration in other services 1.322***
0.080
1.279***
0.063
Repeated interaction
1.175**
0.051
1.192***
0.050
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
1.000
0.000
County Density
0.937
0.082
City population (ln)
0.952
0.191
Median income (ln)
2.341
0.632
County seat
1.602
0.469
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
1.063
0.499
City Manager
0.807
0.865
0.116***
0.271
0.119***
0.268
Constant
1
Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.263 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.420
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.253 and Nagelkerke R2 =0 .405 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of bilateral collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
Table 4.10 also indicates that each one-unit increase in the number of other
service collaborations is associated with a 27.9 percent increase in the likelihood of
bilateral collaboration in public safety. Similarly, each one-year increase in the duration
of collaboration is associated with a 19.2 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral
collaboration in public safety.

Multilateral Collaboration
Results of the binary logistic models predicting the likelihood of multilateral
collaboration in public safety are shown in Table 4.11. In addition to collaboration in
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other services and repeated interaction, a city’s median household income and form of
government also serve as significant predictors of the likelihood of multilateral
collaboration in public safety. The parsimonious model explained approximately 30
percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2
=0.301; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.450).

Table 4.11
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Multilateral
Collaboration in Public Safety1
Variables
Full model
Parsimonious model2
Odds ratios
1.550***
1.090**
1.000
0.930
1.092
0.278**
0.980

S.E
0.094
0.043
0.000
0.088
0.186
0.626
0.422

Odds ratios S.E
1.520***
0.078
1.096**
0.041

Collaboration in other services
Repeated interaction
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
County Density
City population (ln)
Median income (ln)
0.238**
0.508
County seat
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
2.632*
0.512
2.550*
0.401
City Manager
1.011
0.884
Constant
0.189***
0.220
0.192***
0.215
1
Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.304 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.455
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.301 and Nagelkerke R2 =0 .450 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of multilateral collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
From Table 4.11 each one-unit increase in the number of other service
collaborations is associated with a 52 percent increase in the likelihood of multilateral
collaboration in public safety. Similarly, each one-year increase in the duration of
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collaboration is associated with a 9.6 percent increase in the likelihood multilateral
collaboration in public safety. Also, operating as a mayor-council instead of a
commission form of government is associated with a 155 percent increase in the
likelihood of multilateral collaboration in public safety. However, each dollar increase in
median income is associated with a 76.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of multilateral
collaboration in public safety.

Economic Development
Bilateral Collaboration
Table 4.12 shows regression models for the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in
economic development. Out of the eight predictor variables used in the model four
(collaboration in other services, repeated interaction, county seat and city manager)
significantly predict the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic development.
The parsimonious model explained approximately 25 percent of the unexplained variance
of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.246; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.386).
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Table 4.12
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Bilateral Collaboration
in Economic Development 1
Variables

Full model

Collaboration in other services
Repeated interaction

Odds ratios
1.162**
1.143**
0.999

Fiscal Capacity (per capita)

County Density
1.056
City population (ln)
0.874
Median income (ln)
1.757
County seat
5.008**
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
1.202
City Manager
4.227*
Constant
0.134***

Parsimonious Model2
S.E
0.067
0.042
0.001

Odds ratios S.E
1.201**
0.060
1.138**
0.042

0.080
0.189
0.627
0.464

3.417**

0.354

0.505
0.838
0.243

3.037*
0.091***

0.560
0.228

1

Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.255 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.401
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.246 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.386 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of bilateral collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
From Table 4.12, it can be observed that collaboration in other services is
associated with a 20.1 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in
economic development. Additionally, each one-year increase in the duration of
collaboration is associated with a 13.8 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral
collaboration in economic development. Again, being a county seat is associated with a
241.7 percent increase in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic
development. Additionally, being a city manager is associated with a 203.7 percent
increase in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic development.
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Multilateral Collaboration
The results of logistic regressions predicting the likelihood of multilateral
collaboration in economic development are shown in Table 4.13. In all, four variables
(collaboration in other services, repeated interaction, county density and county seat) out
of the eight predictor variables are significant. The parsimonious model explained
approximately 31 percent of the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox
and Snell R2 =0.308; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.498).
Table 4.13
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Multilateral
Collaboration in Economic Development1
Variables
Collaboration in other services
Repeated interaction
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
County Density
City population (ln)
Median income (ln)
County seat
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
City Manager
Constant

Parsimonious model2

Full model
Odds ratios
1.245**
1.101**
1.000
1.419***
1.127
0.660
0.267**

S.E
0.077
0.046
0.000
0.099
0.214
0.682
0.528

1.420
1.829
0.132***

0.534
0.975
0.239

1

Odds ratios
1.271**
1.100**

S.E
0.076
0.045

1.373***

0.086

0.371**

0.457

0.135***

0.234

Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.313 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.506
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.308 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.498 for the
parsimonious model, all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of multilateral collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
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Reference to table 4.13, each one-unit increase in the number of other service
collaborations is associated with a 27.1 percent increase in the likelihood of multilateral
collaboration in economic development. Additionally, each one-year increase in the
duration of collaboration is associated with a 10 percent increase in the likelihood
multilateral collaboration in economic development. Moreover, each one-unit increase in
the number of cities per square mile is associated with a 37.3 percent increase in the
likelihood of multilateral collaboration in economic development. However, being a
county seat is associated with a 62.9 percent decrease in the likelihood of multilateral
collaboration in economic development.

Infrastructure
Bilateral Collaboration
Table 4.14 below provides results of regressions models predicting the likelihood
of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. Three (repeated interaction, county density
and city population) out of the eight predictor variables used in the model are significant.
The parsimonious model explained approximately 16 percent of the unexplained variance
of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.155; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.259).
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Table 4.14
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Bilateral Collaboration
in Infrastructure1
Variables

Parsimonious model2

Full model

Odds ratios
Collaboration in other services 0.974
1.261***
Repeated interaction
1.000
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
0.758
County Density
0.557**
City population (ln)
1.767
Median income (ln)
1.729*
County seat
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
1.011
Mayor Council
1.813
City Manager
0.121***
Constant

S.E
0.061
0.042
0.000
0.116
0.196
0.578
0.444

0.445
0.863
0.232

Odds ratios

S.E

1.255***

0.040

0.763**
0.648**

0.098
0.142

0.125***

0.228

1

Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.166 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.277
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.155 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.259 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of bilateral collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016

From Table 4.14, each one-year increase in the duration of collaboration is
associated with a 25.5 percent increase in the likelihood bilateral collaboration in
infrastructure. However, each one-unit increase in the number of cities per 100 square
miles is associated with a 23.7 percent decrease in the likelihood bilateral collaboration in
infrastructure.

Also, each one-unit increase in the number of people in a city is

associated with a 35.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in
infrastructure.
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Multilateral Collaboration
Table 4.15 provides results of regressions models predicting the likelihood of
multilateral collaboration in infrastructure. Only two variables (collaboration in other
services and repeated interaction) out of the eight predictor variables employed in the
model are significant. The parsimonious model explained approximately 19 percent of
the unexplained variance of the dependent variable (i.e. Cox and Snell R2 =0.19.1;
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.30).
Table 4.15
Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Likelihood of Multilateral
Collaboration in Infrastructure1
Variables

Parsimonious model2

Full model
Odds ratios
1.105*
1.253***
1.000
1.139*
0.984
0.393
0.840

S.E
0.056
0.054
0.001
0.075
0.195
0.639
0.467

Odds ratios
1.127**
1.236***

S.E
0.051
0.053

Collaboration in other services
Repeated interaction
Fiscal Capacity (per capita)
County Density
City population (ln)
Median income (ln)
County seat
Form of Government
(Commission = reference group)
Mayor Council
0.633
0.483
City Manager
0.895
0.854
0.092***
0.295
0.097***
0.289
Constant
1
Based on n = 299 municipalities; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.207 and Nagelkerke R2 = 0.348
for the full model; Cox and Snell R2 = 0.191 and Nagelkerke R2 =0.320 for the
parsimonious model; all independent variables are mean centered so the constant may be
interpreted as the odds of multilateral collaboration for the average municipality
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
2
Parsimonious model produced using backward selection (p >0.10 to exit)
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
From Table 4.15, each one-unit increase in the number of other service
collaborations is associated with a 12.7 percent increase in the likelihood multilateral
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collaboration in infrastructure. Additionally, each one-year increase in the duration of
collaboration is associated with a 23.6 percent increase in the likelihood multilateral
collaboration in infrastructure.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Introduction
A general discussion of results and major findings from the data analyzed in
chapter IV are presented in this chapter. Through the lens of existing theoretical and
empirical literature, the chapter also tests the hypotheses introduced in chapter III.

Characteristics of Services and the Pattern of Collaboration
In the previous chapter, four dependent variables measuring the direction
(horizontal / vertical) and number of partners (bilateral / multilateral) in a collaborative
agreement were examined using data on interlocal service agreements from the Kentucky
Department of Local Government. The dependent variables were examined for three
service categories: (1) public safety (2) economic development and (3) infrastructure
development. Consistent with Brown & Potoski (2001, 2003, 2005) and Andrew &
Hawkins (2012) these three service categories were further examined under four
transaction characteristics: (1) low asset specificity and low service measurability, (2)
high asset specificity and high service measurability, (3) low asset specificity but high
service measurability, and (4) high asset specificity but low service measurability.
Hypotheses 1- 4 were tested based on these four transaction characteristics.
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Descriptive statistics in chapter IV indicated that compared to economic
development (35.4 percent) and infrastructure services (23.5 percent), public safety
services rank highest (41.1 percent) in terms of number of registered interlocal
agreements. The finding on public safety goes contrary to Post’s (2004) assertion that
public safety functions attract less inter-local collaboration because they are mainly labor
intensive. It is however consistent with Carr et al. (2007) and Leroux’s (2006) empirical
findings on interlocal collaboration in Detroit. Given the fact that public safety remains
the largest systems maintenance function on municipal budgets, this finding is
unsurprising.
Descriptive statistics on the direction of collaboration indicated that compared to
other public services, economic development services have a greater association (93.8
percent) with vertical collaboration whilst public safety services have a greater
association (18.8percent) with horizontal collaboration. In terms of the number of
partners in an agreement, infrastructure (85.9 percent) has the greatest association with
bilateral collaboration whilst public safety has the greatest association (27.5 percent) with
multilateral collaboration.
Prior research based on transaction cost theory suggests that transaction
characteristics such as asset specificity and service measurability play important roles in
local governments’ decisions to collaborate (e.g. Andrew, 2009; Andrew & Hawkins,
2012; Brown & Potoski, 2001 2003, 2005; Carr et al., 2009; Feiock & Scholz, 2010;
Hawkins, 2009). From the analyses it became clear that compared to other transaction
characteristics, services that are highly asset specific but easily measurable (911 radio
communications, tax collection & revenue sharing, housing & energy, cable & internet,
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sewer system, telecommunications, water) attract the highest percentage of interlocal
agreements (41.4 percent). Services that are highly asset specific but difficult to measure
(fire protection & response, police protection/ law enforcement, emergency disaster
planning, planning and zoning, building inspection &code enforcement, enterprise zone
& industrial development) rank second (40.1 percent) followed by services that have low
asset specificity but are difficult to measure (11.1 percent) and services that have low
asset specificity but are easy to measure (7.4 percent). These findings support previous
research that all things considered, the specificity of an investment is a major determinant
of interlocal collaboration.
With respect to the direction of collaboration, the analyses indicated that
compared to other transaction characteristics services that are highly asset specific but
easy to measure exhibit a greater association (38.4 percent) with vertical collaboration.
On the other hand services that are highly asset specific but difficult to measure have a
greater association (6.1 percent) with horizontal collaboration. These findings are
inconsistent with hypotheses 1 and 2 that: (1) cities are more likely to collaborate
vertically on services that have high levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty
and (2) cities are more likely to collaborate horizontally on services that have lower
levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.
In terms of the number of partners in an agreement, the analyses indicated that
compared to other transaction characteristics services that are highly asset specific but
easy to measure exhibit a greater association (32.8 percent) with bilateral collaboration.
Services that are highly asset specific but difficult to measure have a greater association
(11 percent) with multilateral collaboration. These findings do not support research
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hypotheses 3 that: (3) cities are more likely to collaborate bilaterally on services that
have lower levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty. They are however
consistent with hypothesis 4 that: (4) cities are more likely to collaborate multilaterally
on services that have higher levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty.

Network Embeddedness and the Pattern of Collaboration
Simon (1945) noted that the “administrative man” unlike the “economic man”,
has fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of economic transactions. Limited
information thus leaves municipalities prone to opportunistic behavior from partners. To
offset this, jurisdictions may rely on relational mechanisms to facilitate exchange
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Previous studies have
suggested that by engaging in repeated exchanges jurisdictions are able to develop trust,
credibility and commitment that help mitigate transaction risks and facilitate further
interlocal exchange (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005). Others have suggested that a city’s
collaboration in one set of service agreements can reinforce collaborations in other sets of
agreements (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005).
In this study, collaborations in other services and repeated interaction were
included in the model to explain how network embededdness influences the direction and
number of partners in a collaborative agreement. The results of the analyses reveal that
with respect to direction, collaborations in other services and repeated interaction best
predict the likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety, explaining 35 percent of
the unexplained variance. This is followed by horizontal collaboration in public safety
(30 percent), vertical collaboration in economic development (27 percent), vertical

98

collaboration in infrastructure (23 percent), horizontal collaboration in infrastructure (17
percent) and horizontal collaboration in economic development (7 percent).
In terms of number of partners, collaborations in other services and repeated
interaction best predict the likelihood of multilateral collaboration in economic
development, explaining 31 percent of the unexplained variance. This is followed by
multilateral collaboration in public safety (30 percent), bilateral collaboration in public
safety (25 percent), multilateral collaboration in infrastructure (19 percent), bilateral
collaboration in economic development (25 percent) and bilateral collaboration in
infrastructure (16 percent) in that order.

Collaboration in other services and the Pattern of Collaboration
Out of twelve (12) regression models, the collaboration in other services variable
was significant in nine (9). The variable was not significant in predicting the likelihood of
vertical collaboration in infrastructure, horizontal collaborations in infrastructure and
bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. The highest percentage increase in the likelihood
of collaboration was recorded for multilateral collaboration in public safety (52 percent
increase) while the lowest percentage increase in the likelihood of collaboration was
recorded for multilateral collaboration in economic development (12.5 percent increase).
The relation between the collaboration in other services variable and the likelihood of
collaboration was positive in all nine (9) models.
By significantly predicting nine out of twelve models, one is justified to concur
with Leroux (2006) and Shrestha (2005) that a city’s collaboration in one set of
agreements reinforces collaborations in other sets of agreements. The research hypothesis
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that collaboration in other service areas has a positive effect on the likelihood of
collaborating on the service in question is therefore supported.

Repeated Interaction and the Pattern of Collaboration
The results of the analyses indicate that repeated interaction is a significant
predictor of the likelihood of collaboration in eleven (11) out of twelve regression
models. The variable was not significant in predicting the likelihood of horizontal
collaboration in economic development. Coefficients in all eleven (11) models show
positive relations between the repeated interaction variable and the likelihood of
collaboration. The highest percentage increase in the likelihood of collaboration was
recorded for horizontal collaboration in infrastructure (52.2 percent increase) while the
lowest percentage increase in the likelihood of collaboration was recorded for multilateral
collaboration in public safety (9.6 percent increase). Given the fact that infrastructure is
an asset specific service with high start-up costs, it is not surprising that it takes a large
amount of trust and credibility developed through repeated interaction to influence
horizontal collaboration on this particular service.
Two factors help explain the low percentage increase recorded for multilateral
collaboration on public safety. In this study almost all the multilateral public safety
agreements recorded had at least one county partner. Since counties hold administrative
and regulatory rights, their involvement in an agreement reduces potential any risks of
opportunistic behaviors. Trust and credibility developed through repeated interactions
will therefore have limited influence in such circumstances.
Notwithstanding these observations the study concurs with the findings of Leroux
(2006) and Shrestha (2005) that where municipalities repeatedly interact they develop
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trust and social capital necessary for forging further cooperative endeavors. The research
hypothesis that repeated interaction in the past between transacting jurisdictions
increases the likelihood of collaboration is thus supported by the above findings.

Fiscal Capacity and the Pattern of Collaboration
Previous studies have often suggested that fiscal stress due to low internal revenue
mobilization or limited federal and state revenue inflows encourage interlocal
collaboration (e.g. Adhikari, 2015; Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations,
1985; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Bartle & Swayze, 1997; Krueger & McGuire, 2005;
MacManus & Caruson, 2008; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Sonenblum et al., 1977; Stein,
1990; Wood, 2004). In this study fiscal capacity was a significant predictor in one model
– the likelihood of vertical collaboration in infrastructure. The relation between fiscal
capacity and vertical collaboration was negative indicating that each dollar increase in a
city’s own revenue per capita was associated with 0.1 percent decrease in the likelihood
of vertical collaboration in infrastructure. Given the fact that infrastructure is an asset
specific service with high start-up cost, it stands to reason that cities may collaborate with
counties only when their capacity to fund these services themselves is low. It is therefore
not surprising that the likelihood of collaborating with counties decrease as cities’
internally generated revenues increase.
Since fiscal capacity was a significant predictor in only one (1) out of twelve (12)
models, one may concur with previous findings by Carr et al., (2007); Leroux, (2006);
Shrestha, (2005); Thurmaier, (2005); Thurmaier and Wood (2002) that a local
government’s fiscal capacity does little to predict interlocal collaboration.
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County Density and the Pattern of Collaboration
According to Axelrod (1984) when jurisdictions are in close proximity they tend
to interact more. This research assumes that cities located within a common county have
a shared value system and responsibility towards the development of their jurisdictions.
Where more cities exist per 100 square miles of county, there is a high likelihood for
close collaboration and vice versa.
In this study the local government density variable was significant in predicting
the likelihood of collaboration in four (4) regression models – vertical collaboration in
public safety, multilateral collaboration in economic development, bilateral collaboration
in infrastructure and horizontal collaboration in infrastructure. The highest percentage
increase in the likelihood of collaboration was recorded for horizontal collaboration in
infrastructure (39.4 percent increase). The relation between the local government density
variable and the likelihood of collaboration was negative in two (2) models – vertical
collaboration in public safety (47.5 percent decrease) and bilateral collaboration in
infrastructure (23.7 decrease).
Infrastructure services usually have high start-up costs. For efficiency gains,
municipalities in high density areas are better off developing infrastructure services
together and sharing these start-up costs. It is not surprising that as the number of cities
per 100 square miles increases, the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in infrastructure
increases. This finding is consistent with the observations of Axelrod (1984), Post (2002),
Leroux (2006), Shrestha (2005) and Adhikari (2015) that density of municipalities has a
positive influence on the likelihood of interlocal cooperation.

102

Aside having high start-up costs, infrastructure services are also highly asset
specific and therefore more prone to opportunism. To avoid opportunistic behavior
municipalities in high density areas may prefer to have less bilateral collaborations on
infrastructure services. This explains why as the number of cities per 100 square miles
increases, the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure decreases. Public
safety services on the other hand have spillover effects (positive externalities). It is easy
for a neighboring jurisdiction B to benefit from jurisdiction A’s law enforcement services
without participating in any agreements. Where several municipalities exist per 100
square miles, the motivation to collaborate with a county on public safety may be low
since municipalities have increased incentive to free-ride and enjoy public safety services
from their neighbors. The finding that as the density of local governments increases the
likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety decreases is therefore not surprising.

City Population and the Pattern of Collaboration
Some prior studies, a city’s population indicates its potential for achieving
economies of scale (cf. Adhikari, 2015; Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005; LeRoux et al.,
2010; Nelson, 1997). Thus population size is regarded as a good predictor of interlocal
collaboration. Two opposing views exist regarding the direction of the population size
hypothesis. There are those that hypothesize that smaller jurisdictions are more likely to
support interlocal collaboration because operating independently they may not be able to
provide public services in a cost efficient manner. By pooling resources together small
cities can improve the efficiency of service delivery (Andrew, 2008a; Mohr et al., 2010).
Conversely, others hypothesize that larger jurisdiction are more likely to collaborate
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because they tend to have lower cost of obtaining information, negotiating agreements
and enforcing agreements (Kwon & Feiock, 2010). Caruson and MacManus (2006a) have
observed for instance that in emergency management preparedness that because larger
jurisdictions are prone to more vulnerabilities, they tend to have extensive emergency
preparedness networks.
In this study population size was a significant predictor in two out of twelve
regression models – the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in economic development
and the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. The relation between
population size and the likelihood of horizontal collaboration was positive. However, the
relation between population size and the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in
infrastructure was negative. Each one-unit increase in the size of a city’s population was
associated with a 35.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in
infrastructure. As explained earlier, because infrastructure services are capital intensive
and asset specific they are more prone to opportunism. Rational and self interested cities
may prefer to look for alternatives that are less likely to attract opportunistic behavior as
population increases and demand for infrastructure surges. Additionally, cities with large
populations are more likely to have large tax resources to fund infrastructure investment
and may not need to collaborate. These explain why as population increases the
likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure decreases.

Median Household Income and the Direction of Collaboration
A city’s median household income is a general proxy for its aggregate effective
demand for services (Leroux, 2006; Shrestha, 2005). It may also be considered as an
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indicator of a city’s fiscal capacity (Adhikari, 2015). Similar to the population size
hypothesis, there are conflicting views as to the direction of the median income
hypothesis. There are those that hypothesize that cities with lower median incomes are
more likely to support interlocal collaboration because it enables them to take advantage
of the financial resources available to other cities (c.f Leroux and Carr, 2007). Adhikari
(2015) surmises that residents of cities with lower median household incomes rely
heavily on public infrastructure and other social-benefit programs. It stands to reason
therefore that the likelihood of lower median income cities collaborating with other local
governments will be high.
Yet still, there are others who suggest the direction of the median income
hypothesis is curvilinear. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) posit that both poor and rich
communities enter into interlocal agreements based on different financial motivations.
Communities with low median incomes collaborate in order to cut down administrative
and production costs while rich communities collaborate because they can enjoy more
services at an affordable price.
In this study median household income was a significant predictor of the
likelihood of collaboration in four (4) models – multilateral collaboration in public safety,
vertical collaboration in public safety, horizontal collaboration in public safety and
horizontal collaboration in infrastructure. The relation between the median household
income variable and the likelihood of horizontal collaboration in public safety was
positive (643.3 percent increase) and consistent with the observations of Morgan and
Hirlinger (1991). However, each dollar increase in median income was associated with a
76.2 percent decrease in the likelihood of multilateral collaboration in public safety. Also,
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each dollar increase in median income was associated with a 67.9 percent decrease in the
likelihood of vertical collaboration in public safety.
Having a high median income means a city can afford to provide better quality
public safety services to its citizens and may be more inclined to produce them. It also
means a city can maintain exclusivity by avoiding too many partners in a public safety
agreement. Additionally, it means high income cities can take more risks by collaborating
less with the county and more with other cities on specialized public safety services.
In the case of infrastructure services, the results indicated that each dollar increase
in median income is associated with a 93.6 percent decrease in the likelihood of
horizontal collaboration in infrastructure. Given the fact that infrastructure services are
capital intensive and asset specific even when median incomes increase cities may still
prefer to look for other modes of service delivery that are less prone to opportunism.

County Seat and the Direction of Collaboration
A county seat status suggests that a city’s administrative branch has close
proximity to the corridors of power. Where a city serves as county seat, it is more likely
to have a high concentration of county administrative offices. The proximity of county
officials to city officials would invariably increase the likelihood of collaboration.
In this study the county seat variable was a significant predictor of the likelihood
of collaboration in four (4) regression models – horizontal collaboration in public safety,
vertical collaboration in economic development, bilateral collaboration in economic
development and multilateral collaboration in economic development. The relation
between county seat and the likelihood of vertical collaboration in economic
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development was positive (208.7 percent increase). Similarly, the relation between the
county seat variable and the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic
development was positive (241.7 percent increase). However, being a county seat was
associated with a 62.9 percent decrease in the likelihood of collaborating multilaterally in
economic development and a 70.7 percent decrease in the likelihood of collaborating
horizontally in public safety.
By virtue of being administrative seats, cities that serve as county capitals have
significant access to economic development services. This implies that any interlocal
collaboration on economic development services may be limited to a few partners instead
of multiple collaborating partners. Similarly, proximity to the corridors of power means
cities that serve as county seats have ready access to county law enforcement services and
other public safety services. The likelihood of these cities participating in interlocal
collaboration with other cities in the county on public safety services is sure to decrease.

Form of Government and the Direction of Collaboration
The form of government characterizes the political and institutional conditions of
a city. According to the administrative conjunction theory the longer tenure and
commonly shared public service ethic among professional administrators makes them
more development oriented compared to elected officials (Frederickson, 1999). Prior
studies have therefore hypothesized based on the theory of administrative conjunctions
that cities in a council-manager form of government are more likely to participate in
interlocal cooperation than cities with a mayor-council government (Brown & Potoski,
2003; Ruhil et al., 1999; Schneider et al., 1995)
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In this study, form of government was significant in three regression models –
bilateral collaboration in economic development, horizontal collaboration in public safety
and vertical collaboration in economic development. The relation between the form of
government variable and the likelihood of collaboration in all three models was positive.
Having a city manager form of government was associated with a 473.2 percent increase
in the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in economic development and a 461.1 percent
increase in the likelihood of vertical collaboration in economic development. Having a
mayor-council form of government was associated with a 193.3 percent increase in the
likelihood of horizontal collaboration in public safety. Giving the fact that the city
manager form of government is seen to be more development oriented than its councilmayor counterpart, it is not surprising to find in this study that having a manager form of
government is associated with bilateral and vertical collaboration in economic
development. These findings are consistent with the observations of Leroux (2006),
Shrestha (2005) and Adhikari (2015) that form of government has an influence on the
likelihood of interlocal cooperation.

Table 5.1 provides a summary of variables that were significant in the study whilst table
5.2 provides a summary of test results for the research hypotheses.
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Table 5.1
Summary of Significant Variables
Variables
Collaboration in
other services
Repeated
interaction
Fiscal Capacity
County Density
City population
Median income
County seat
Mayor Council
City Manager

Public Safety
V.
yes

H. M.
yes yes

B.
yes

Economic
Infrastructure
development
V.
H. M. B.
V.
H. M. B.
yes yes yes yes yes
-

yes

yes yes

yes

yes

-

yes
yes

- *yes - - *yes yes *yes
- *yes yes - -

-

yes

yes yes

- *yes yes
yes
yes
- *yes
- *yes yes yes -

V. vertical
H. horizontal
M. multilateral
B. bilateral
*variable is significant but inconsistent with expected direction
Spaces marked (-) indicates variable is not significant in the model.
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016
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yes

yes

yes

-

*yes
*yes
-

Table 5.2
Results of Test of Hypotheses
Hypotheses

Results

Hypothesis 1:
Cities are more likely to collaborate vertically on services
that have high levels of asset specificity and measurement
difficulty.

Not supported
Services that have high
levels of asset specificity
and measurement
difficulty have a greater
association with
horizontal collaboration

Hypothesis 2:
Cities are more likely to collaborate horizontally on
services that have lower levels of asset specificity and
measurement difficulty.

Not supported

Hypothesis 3:
Cities are more likely to collaborate multilaterally on
services that have higher levels of asset specificity and
measurement difficulty.

Supported

Hypothesis 4:
Not Supported
Cities are more likely to collaborate bilaterally on services
that have lower levels of asset specificity and
measurement difficulty
Hypothesis 5:
Repeated interaction in the past between transacting
jurisdictions increases the likelihood of collaboration.

Supported

Hypothesis 6:
Collaboration in other service areas has a positive effect
on the likelihood of collaborating on the service in
question.
Source: Author’s Construct, 2016

Supported

110

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Collaborative governance has gained traction in recent years. From environmental
resource management to public safety, collaborative governance continues to play a vital
role in regional problem solving. Proponents have attributed the increasing popularity of
the concept to the changing dynamics and complexity of 21st century problems which
require collaborative efforts beyond the fragmented state.
Indeed, for a long time America’s fragmented political system has been an
enduring subject of debate attracting both support and criticisms. Proponents, particularly
those from the public choice school, have often viewed fragmentation as an opportunity
competition and efficiency in public service delivery. On the other hand, some critics
have repudiated the system for its duplicative and wasteful tendencies (Frederickson,
1999). Other critics have cited problems of inner city decline, widening of the income
gap between central cities and suburbs and environmental degradation as some of the
problems of America’s fragmented local government system. As a solution to these
negative impacts some scholars have proposed political consolidation. Yet evidence
suggests consolidation by itself also creates principal-agent problems which lead to
further inefficiencies in the supply of public services.
To avoid loss of jurisdictional autonomy from political consolidation and the
occasional lack of private market for certain public services from public choice, many
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local governments have embraced the idea of pulling resources together with other local
governments to deliver public services. The surge of interest in collaborative governance
concept calls for critical enquiry into why local governments chose certain types of
interlocal agreements. Questions worthy of enquiry include: (1) what motivates interlocal
collaboration? (2) How do interlocal agreements differ by service type? (3) What are the
directions of collaboration? (4) What number of partners is appropriate for collaboration?

Determinants of Vertical, Horizontal, Multilateral and Bilateral Collaboration
This study sought to find answers to the questions listed above by examining the
patterns of interlocal collaboration in the Commonwealth of Kentucky using transaction
cost theory and the concept of exchange embeddedness as theoretical lenses. Based on
existing interlocal agreement data from the Kentucky Department of Local Governments
this study has shown that for services like public safety, economic development and
infrastructure, majority of municipalities prefer to participate in agreements that have at
least one county government as partner. Similarly, majority of municipalities prefer to be
in agreements that have only two participating local governments.
The study has also buttressed previous findings that the transaction characteristics
of services (asset specificity and service measurability) have strong influence on the
likelihood of collaboration. In terms of direction, the study has confirmed that services
that have high levels of asset specificity but easily measurable have a greater association
with vertical collaboration whilst services that have high levels of asset specificity and
measurement difficulty have a greater association with horizontal collaboration. It has
also established that that services that have high levels of asset specificity but easily
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measurable have a greater association with bilateral collaboration whilst services that
have high levels of asset specificity and measurement difficulty have a greater association
with multilateral collaboration.
The study has further established that a municipality’s collaborations in other
services and repeated interaction in the past have the most influence on the likelihood of
vertical collaboration in public safety and the least influence on the likelihood of
horizontal collaboration in economic development. In terms of number of partners, the
study has shown that collaborations in other services and repeated interaction have the
most influence on the likelihood of multilateral collaboration for public safety and the
least influence on the likelihood of bilateral collaboration in infrastructure. The study has
thus demonstrated that repeated interactions in the past and collaborations in other related
services have significant influence on interlocal collaborations.

Implications of Study: Main Contributions to Scholarship
The study has made important contributions that enhance existing knowledge on
collaborative governance in the fields of public management, and urban studies. It has
validated and in certain cases refuted hypotheses by its predecessors. At the conceptual
level, the study complements the existing theory of collaborative governance and helps
initiate further scholarly discussion on the topic. Spatially, the research contributes to the
existing practice of regionalism by providing in-depth explanation to the structure and
nature of exchange in collaborative governance.
Previous research has focused on the general determinants of collaboration
without identifying what services are the strongest candidates for collaboration. To a
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certain extent, this study has addressed this gap by examining three important local
government services – public safety, economic development and infrastructure. From the
analyses, public safety ranked highest as the service that attracts most collaborative
agreements.
Previous research has also failed to examine the different levels of government
that mostly appear as candidates for partnerships. This study has addressed this gap by
identifying and examining two directions of collaboration – vertical and horizontal. The
analyses of data revealed that vertical collaboration remains the preferred mode of
collaboration for municipalities.
Again, previous research has failed to examine the number of partners in
collaborative arrangements. This study has addressed this gap by identifying and
examining two types of partners – multilateral and bilateral. The analyses of data
revealed that bilateral collaboration remains the preferred mode of collaboration for
municipalities.
Finally the study has also corroborated findings from previous research that the
transaction cost and relational dimensions of exchange are important determinants of
local governments’ choice of interlocal exchange.

Limitations of This Study
Notwithstanding its theoretical, methodological and empirical strengths, this study
is limited in a number of ways. First, the robustness of the results in this study could have
been improved by examining both the likelihood and magnitude of collaboration in
Kentucky. Statistical analyses on the magnitude of collaboration were not performed in
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this study because of the general lack of data on intergovernmental revenues and
expenditures. Where data was available from the US Census Bureau and State databases,
revenue and expenditure streams between counties and cities were usually not reported.
The Kentucky ‘City Uniform Financial Information Report’, which is the source of
intergovernmental revenue and expenditure data did not provide any information on city
to county revenue transfers. Thus even in cases where data on city to city revenue
transfers existed, this research was still limited in the area of county to city transfers.
Additionally, most of the intergovernmental transfers registered with the Department of
Local Governments were joint service agreements rather than pay-for-service
agreements, meaning there was more human resource and equipment transfers than fund
transfers.
Second, this study was undertaken based on secondary data from only one state
(Kentucky) in the entire US. Because the US is politically, economically and socially
diverse, the results from this study cannot be taken in its entirety as a true reflection of
the patterns of collaboration in the country. Research shows for instance that local
government decisions are to a large extent influenced by state rules and regulations
Krueger and Bernick 2010, 714). Since every state rule affects localities differently it
stands to reason that the causal chains of collaboration at the local level in Kentucky may
be different from that of Indiana for instance.
Third, the study uses data on municipalities that range from very small (230
people) to small (61,488 people). This selection eliminates mid-sized and large cities
which are known to offer more variety of services to residents. To the extent that this
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study relies on a small sample data from only one state in the US, any generalizations
from this study will have to be made with a certain degree of caution.
Finally, the study showed high percentage figures for vertical collaborations. This
may be critiqued on purely methodological grounds. In my analyses every agreement that
had at least one county partner was deemed vertical even if it had only one county but
several cities. The study was designed based on the premise that the role of counties as
administrative arms of the state gives them the upper hand in an agreement (Dustin et al.,
2009). The counter argument is that in some agreements large municipalities may rather
have the upper hand because of their superior management systems (Caruson &
MacManus, 2006b, 2008).

Future Direction of Research
While this study has been largely successful in explaining the patterns of
interlocal collaboration, there still remains certain theoretical aspects of the concept that
need further investigations and clarifications. This research can serve as a good starting
point for such future investigations.
First, in terms geographic of scope, the study was restricted to one out of 50 states
in the US. Moreover, the units of analyses did not include mid-sized and large cities
which are known to offer more variety of services to residents. Future studies should
correct this anomaly by expanding the study to include mid-size and large MSAs from
other states. Enlarging the scope of the study to include cites and MSAs in all four
geographic regions of the US will improve the generalizability of results.
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Second, the direction and number of partners in a collaborative arrangement
should not be solely determined by a binary choice (yes or no). it is an established fact
that collaborative arrangements between local governments also differ in terms of the
degree of collaboration. In public safety for instance the degree of collaboration on law
enforcement services between jurisdiction X and Y may be entirely different from a
similar agreement between jurisdiction A and B. The use of revenue and expenditure data
to analyze the degree of interlocal agreement in any future research will bolster the
findings of this study.
Third, the influence of transaction characteristics (asset specificity and
measurement difficulty) on the pattern of collaboration was examined in this study using
descriptive statistics. This method can be improved by using scalar measures of asset
specificity and measurement difficulty for all services in future studies. A database of
asset specificity and service measurability measures derived from a survey of local
government officials across the US will improve future results.
Fourth, future research should consider exploring the spatial dynamics of vertical,
horizontal, multilateral and bilateral collaboration. Although this study enhanced our
understanding of the patterns of collaboration, it failed to show how such patterns self
organize in space. The use of GIS to generate such interactions will improve our
understanding of how collaborative governance manifests across regions.
Finally, future studies should explore the extent to which vertical, horizontal,
bilateral and multilateral patterns of interlocal service delivery produce cost savings,
improve service quality and enhance citizen satisfaction. Having a good understanding of
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the benefits of these four patterns of collaboration will be helpful for local government
practitioners in decision making.
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APPENDIX 1:
Municipal Service Classification by Asset Specificity and Service Measurability
Low Asset Specificity
High Asset Specificity
Meterable Monopoly Services
Meterable Market Services
Easy
Operation of Bus System
Residential Solid Waste
Metering
Operation of Paratransit System
Commercial Solid Waste
Operation of Airports
Solid Waste Disposal
Water Distribution
Street Repair
Water Treatment
Street/Parking Lot Clearing
Sewage Collection and Treatment
Snow Plowing/Sanding
Disposal of Sludge
Traffic Signs
Electricity
Tree Trimming
Gas
Cemetery Maintenance and
Hospital Management
Operation
Operation of Libraries
Parking Lot Operation
Operation of Museums
Utility Meter Reading
Heavy Equipment Maintenance
Utility Meter Billing
Emergency Vehicle Maintenance
Hazardous Materials Disposal
Tax Collection
Vehicle Towing
Title/Plat Maintenance
Convention Center Operation
Parking Meter Maintenance
Building/Grounds Maintenance
Police and Fire Communications
Vehicle Maintenance
Payroll
Secretarial Services
Personnel Services
Daycare Facilities
Park Landscaping
Data Processing
Non-Meterable Market Services
Non-Meterable Monopolistic
Difficult
Child Welfare
Services
Metering
Programs for the Elderly
Crime Prevention
Drug Treatment
Fire Prevention
Homeless Shelters
Traffic Control
Recreation Facilities
Sanitary Inspection
Building Security
Inspection and Code Enforcement
Insect and Rodent Control
Prisons and Jails
Animal Control
Animal Shelters
Public Health Programs
Mental Health Programs
Legal Services
Public Relations
Tax Assessment
Emergency Medical Services
Ambulance Services
Brown and Potoski (2001. Pg. 31; 2003)
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